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Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship
Abstract
This Article analyzes authoritative sources concerning the Americans with
Disabilities Act accommodation requirement and concludes:
(1) Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of the same
coin. The statutory duty is accommodation up to the limit of hardship, and reasonable
accommodation should not be a separate hurdle for claimants to surmount apart from the
undue hardship defense. There is no such thing as “unreasonable accommodation” or
“due hardship.”
(2) The duty to accommodate is a substantial obligation, one that may be
expensive to satisfy, and one that is not subject to a cost-benefits balance, but rather a
cost-resources balance; it is also subject to increase over time.
(3) The accommodation duty entails mandatory departure from neutral workplace
rules, effectively creating a preference for workers with disabilities, but one not to be
confused with the affirmative action concept found in other anti-discrimination regimes.
These conclusions are in some respects consistent with, and in other respects
quite inconsistent with, leading judicial interpretations, including the single Supreme
Court case on accommodations in employment, U.S. Airways v. Barnett. The Article will
suggest avenues by which courts may be led back to the correct interpretation of
reasonable accommodation by looking to the text of the statute and its legislative history,
interpretations by the enforcing agency, judicial construction of analogous language
elsewhere in the ADA, and precedent from other jurisdictions.
For twenty years, judicial and scholarly attention focused on who is a person with
a disability entitled to the protections of the ADA. Narrow readings of coverage kept
many cases with accommodations claims from reaching decision on the merits. Recently,
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act, vastly expanding the range of covered
individuals. After the Amendments, attention will turn to what accommodations
employers must provide. This Article is the first to return to the original sources to
determine what Congress required and to analyze both Barnett and the lower court cases
in light of that understanding.
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Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires an employer to make “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability” unless the employer demonstrates “that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity.”1 This accommodation duty is the defining characteristic of modern disability
discrimination statutes,2 and the key term distinguishing those enactments from laws that
forbid race and sex discrimination.3 If the ADA is the “Emancipation Proclamation for
1

42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5) (West 2010). Because of the significant number of recent changes in many
statutory provisions cited in this Article, federal statutes will generally be cited to West’s United States
Code Annotated rather than the official United States Code. This Article focuses on the employment title
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, title I, §§ 12111-12117. Hence the term “covered entity” and
“employer” will generally be interchangeable. See § 12111(2). Other titles cover state and local
government (title II), privately-owned public accommodations (title III), telecommunications (title IV), and
general matters such as retaliation and attorneys’ fees (title V). In this Article, the Americans with
Disabilities Act will be referred to as the “ADA,” or “Act.”
2
Comparative law sources stress the importance of the obligation in making statutes effective in integrating
people with disabilities into the workplace. See, e.g., Lisa Waddington, When It Is Reasonable for
Europeans to be Confused: Understanding When a Disability Is “Reasonable” from a Comparative
Perspective, http:ssrn.com/abstract=1128295 (visited Apr. 15, 2008). Many authorities describe the
ADA’s accommodation obligation as crucial. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (“Importantly, the statute takes the concept of
forbidden discrimination beyond intentional and overt exclusion; it also treats as discrimination the failure
to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ to people with disabilities.”).
3
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996) (“[Failure to provide reasonable accommodation] is a far different definition of
‘discrimination’ than the definition embraced in other areas of employment discrimination law. Title VII,
for instance, essentially takes jobs as it finds them. It defines discrimination in a negative sense:
employment practices are unlawful only if they prevent individuals from doing the job as the employer
defines it.”). Some prominent sources take issue with this proposition, but their response is less that the
accommodations requirement is conceptually unique than that traditional anti-discrimination provisions
also impose economic inefficiencies on employers by doing such things as forbidding hiring and firing on
the basis of consumer and co-worker preferences. See Samuel Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination,
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 859-70 (2003) (tracing
normative ramifications); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
684-94 (2001) (developing general position); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 616-22 (2004) (tracing economic
ramifications). Even those who take broader positions linking reasonable accommodation with other antidiscrimination mandates note that disability discrimination law’s reasonable accommodation provision
entails differences in interpretation from other statutes. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable
Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 865 (2004).
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people with disabilities,”4 the accommodations requirement is the Thirteenth
Amendment: the enforceable duty that requires changes in the way things have always
been done, in order to permit people with disabilities to integrate into society on a plane
equal to that of others.5
Nonetheless, the interpretation of the ADA’s accommodations requirement
remains severely underdeveloped.6 For twenty years, judicial and scholarly attention
focused on who is a person with a disability entitled to the protections of the law.7
Narrow readings of coverage provisions kept many cases with accommodations claims
from reaching decision on the merits.8 Ultimately, Congress enacted a new statute—the

None of the sources contests the importance of a strong accommodation duty in the ADA for achieving
functional equality for persons with disabilities.
4
136 Cong. Rec. S12017 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
5
See Cass R. Sunstein, Caste and Disability: The Moral Foundations of the ADA, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 101 (2008) (describing reasonable accommodation duty in ADA as “the clearest reflection, in
American law, of an anti-caste principle—a principle that raises questions about social and legal practices
that turn a morally irrelevant difference into a systematic source of social disadvantage.”) (footnotes
omitted).
6
Witness the aptly titled article, John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is Reasonable
Accommodation Under the ADA? Not an Easy Answer; Rather a Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C.L. REV.
67 (2008-09). Holdings on reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are contradictory and often
poorly reasoned. See infra text accompanying notes 149-226 (describing accommodations caselaw).
7
A vast number of sources collect, analyze, and criticize the even more vast caselaw on this topic. Among
the more prominent articles are: Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000); Robert L. Burgdorf, Substantially Limited Protection from
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997); Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It, 21 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 91 (2000); Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2004);
Jane Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001).
8
See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 358 (2001)
(“By constricting the meaning of ‘disability’ to such an extent, the Court has blocked at the gate the vast
majority of claims that would otherwise proceed to trial or settlement.”); Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of
Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species Functioning” in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 247 n. 107 (2006) (“To date, the Supreme Court has so narrowly construed the
disability threshold test that few cases have made it through to the reasonable accommodation analysis.
Further, since the Court groups the inquiry of whether someone is disabled with whether they are entitled to
a remedy, analysis surrounding whether accommodations should be made, and if so, what they should be, is
often muddled with disability eligibility questions, making it difficult to determine how courts approach
reasonable accommodation.”); see also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with
Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008),
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ADA Amendments (ADAAA)—designed to end the coverage controversy by
disapproving two Supreme Court decisions and vastly expanding the range of covered
individuals.9 After the ADAAA, attention will turn to what accommodations employers
must provide in order to comply with the Act.10
This Article analyzes authoritative sources concerning the accommodation
requirement’s intended meaning and concludes: (1) Reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship are two sides of the same coin: The statutory duty is one of
accommodation up to the limit of hardship, and reasonable accommodation should not be
a separate hurdle for claimants to surmount apart from the undue hardship defense
offered employers—the title of this Article notwithstanding, there is no such thing as
“unreasonable accommodation” or “due hardship.” (2) The duty to accommodate is a
significant burden, one that may be expensive to satisfy, and one that is subject not to a
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44 (“[Before the 2008
Amendments], courts strained to avoid having to make decisions as to the reasonableness of an
accommodation by adopting a strict definition of disability.”); Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of
Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. J. 79, 125 (“By halting . . . claims [of persons with personality disorders] at the
claim’s definitional stage—where the plaintiff is essentially “classified” for statutory purposes—courts
evade the more complex issue of how society must, if at all, accommodate those whose personalities it has
labeled as disordered.”).
9
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). See generally Long, supra note 8 (describing expansion of
coverage and other provisions in ADAAA). Congress disapproved Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that impairments must be evaluated in their mitigated state in determining if
individual is individual with disability), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002) (holding that terms of disability definition are to be strictly construed), § 2(b)(2)-(5); provided that
impairments are to be evaluated in a state not mitigated by medication, appliances, or bodily systems
(except, in general, ordinary eyeglasses), § 3(4)(E); provided that major life activities whose substantial
impairment triggers coverage include major internal bodily systems and functions, § 3(2); established that
persons covered by virtue of being regarded as having an impairment need not be perceived to have an
impairment that limits a major life activity, § 3(3); and made additional changes.
10
See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Discrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 540
(2008) (“[B]y including greater numbers of individuals in the protected class, the [AD]AAA will likely
focus more attention on whether accommodations impose an undue hardship on an employer.”). Some
view this shift of focus with alarm. Professor Travis writes, “In fact, if the ADAAA succeeds in its primary
objective of shifting litigation focus away from scrutinizing whether an individual is or is not disabled, and
toward the issue of whether employers have fulfilled their reasonable accommodation obligations, the
ADAAA actually may reinvigorate the backlash as the accommodation mandate becomes more visible and
more contested.” Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 320 (2009).
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cost-benefits balance, but instead to a cost-resources balance that varies with the
capacities of the employer; it is also a dynamic obligation liable to increase over time.
(3) The accommodation duty entails mandatory departure from neutral workplace rules,
effectively creating a preference for workers with disabilities, but one not to be confused
with the affirmative action concept found in other anti-discrimination regimes. These
conclusions are in some respects consistent with, and in other respects quite inconsistent
with, leading judicial interpretations of the accommodations term, including the single
Supreme Court case on accommodations in employment, U.S. Airways v. Barnett.11 The
Article will suggest avenues by which courts may be led back to the correct interpretation
of reasonable accommodation by looking to the text of the statute and its legislative
history, interpretation by the federal agency charged with the ADA’s enforcement,
judicial constructions of analogous language elsewhere in the ADA, and precedent
regarding comparable enactments from other jurisdictions.
Significant scholarship exists on the subject of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship,12 but this Article is the first to return to the original sources to determine
what Congress meant and to analyze both Barnett and the lower court cases in light of
that understanding. This Article contributes to the scholarly debate by suggesting a
revised understanding of accommodation—that accommodation and hardship are the
same concept, that the burden is significant and subject to grow over time, and that

11

535 U.S. 391 (2002).
In addition to sources cited and discussed later in this article, notable scholarship on accommodations
includes: Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
323 (2006); Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the
ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123 (2003); James Leonard,
The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA
Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2005); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations:
Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006).
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neutral rules are not sacrosanct—supported by the language and legislative history of the
ADA, as well as cases interpreting other parts of the ADA and interpretations of other
similar enactments.
Part I of this Article discusses Congress’s original meaning for the reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship provision and draws the conclusions about the provision
outlined above. To do so, it discusses methods of statutory interpretation, then the text,
legislative history, enforcing agency interpretations, and social context of the ADA. Part
II considers judicial interpretations of the term, both at the lower court and Supreme
Court level. Part III discusses correcting the courts’ interpretation of the
accommodations requirement by returning to original sources, drawing on available but
untapped precedent, and letting lay triers of fact take the primary role in determining the
propriety of accommodations.

I. THE MEANING OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
To determine the correct meaning of the reasonable accommodation duty and its
undue hardship limit, it is necessary to examine leading theories of statutory
interpretation. The most sensible approach to interpretation calls for analyzing the
language of the statute, the legislative history, the interpretation of the agency charged
with enforcing the law, and the social context in which the law was passed. From that
raw material, it is possible to fashion a clear meaning for the ADA’s accommodation
term.

7

A.

APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
There are two leading theories about interpreting statutes: intentionalism and

textualism.13 Intentionalism, sometimes labeled purposivism,14 interprets statutes so as to
accomplish what the enacting legislature wanted to do. When there are ambiguities in
text, intentionalists look primarily to authoritative legislative history such as committee
reports and the statements of legislators taking a leadership role in the passage of a
statute.15 Intentionalists argue that the courts should be acting as agents of the legislature,
and to be a faithful agent, it sometimes is necessary to look beyond the words of a
command for the underlying goals of the principal.16
Textualists respond that the legislature as a whole is the principal, and that it
enacts only the text of the statute.17 Many view reliance on texts other than those that
made it into law as improper avoidance of the legislative machinery established by the

13

Some approaches attempt to bridge the main ones. For example, Professor Bell suggests a “public
justification” method, which would look only to text of a law and a limited category of institutional
statements justifying the law, such as committee reports and committee chairs’ comments. Bernard W.
Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory
Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1999). This approach permits reference to the legislative materials
relied on here in connection with interpreting the ADA. Professors Eskridge and Frickey suggest an
approach based on practical reasoning that draws from the theories behind textualism and contrasting
approaches. William P. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). Their approach also countenances the use of legislative history in
appropriate circumstances. See id. at 356 (“In accordance with the Court's practice, our practical reasoning
model also considers the original expectations of the Congress that enacted the statute. . . . The most
authoritative historical evidence is the legislative history of the statute . . . .”). A few authorities seem to
reject all approaches. For example, Professor Selmi finds neither textualism nor intentionalism satisfactory
with regard to interpreting the definition of disability found in the ADA; he also rejects a “positive political
theory” approach, which relies on judicial ideas about the preferences of the current, rather than the
enacting, Congress. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme
Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 566 (2008).
14
It is possible to draw a distinction between intentionalism and purposivism, but the present discussion
does not require it. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 325-40 (drawing distinction); Joel
Schellhammer, Recent Case, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1119, 1126-29 (2006) (distinguishing “classical
interpretivism,” textualism, and “modern purposivism”).
15
This includes drafters and floor managers. See, e.g., Jonathan Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a
System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000).
16
See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990).
17
See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2001).
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Constitution.18 Some even challenge the idea that a corporate body has anything that be
called an intent,19 while others note that the legislative process involves compromises
among conflicting purposes, making the statements of proponents unreliable as a guide to
the purposes of the whole.20 Textualists view discoveries of enactors’ underlying
intentions as thinly veiled preferences of the interpreters themselves.21 They favor use of
canons of construction, structure and relationship arguments, even dictionaries when
confronted with ambiguous statutory text.22
A strict textualist approach has many flaws. Its skepticism of the concept of
intent is at odds with textualism’s own use of mechanisms such as looking to the meaning
of the same words in other statutes and reliance on the enactment’s structure, methods
that assume that the legislature intended at least something that can be discerned by
interpretation.23 Even if congressional intent is a legal construct, it is hardly different
from the intent of corporations or government agencies, something that courts routinely
18

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 696-99 (1997) (describing conventional textualist position), 706-37 (describing author’s preferred
variation on conventional position).
19
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Because
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable.”).
20
See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1984) (“If statutes are bargains among special interests, they should be
enforced like contracts. . . . Thus the Court will . . . reject efforts by consumers to use litigation to
‘improve’ the operation of statutes that were not designed to help consumers in the first place.”).
21
See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 63 (“Having a wide field to play-not only the statute but also the
debates, not only the rules but also the values they advance, and so on-liberates judges. This is
objectionable on grounds of democratic theory as well as on grounds of predictability.”). Textualists fear
that isolated statements in legislative background material, perhaps intentionally planted by congressional
staffers and unread by most representatives voting for a measure, will mislead a court interpreting the
statute. See Manning, supra note 18, at 686-89 (presenting conventional view), 731-37 (presenting
somewhat more nuanced view).
22
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-37 (1997).
23
Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1319; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 456 (2005) (“Take, for
example, the rule of construction that statutory words are to be given their ‘ordinary meaning.’ What is the
rationale for this rule? It is based on the assumption that legislative drafters are most likely to use words
that way. If a court adopts that assumption, it will be more likely to make a decision that is loyal to the
legislature's intention.”) (footnote omitted).
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rely upon in deciding cases.24 And the textualist approach exalts the power of the
judiciary by permitting it to reach results which the legislature, if it has anything that can
be called intent at all, would not want to have come about.25 Among the various places to
look for the meaning of unclear statutory terms, legislative history is a far more natural
choice than the enigmatic and contradictory canons of statutory construction, or
definitions drawn from arbitrarily chosen dictionaries.26 Legislators rely on party leaders

24

See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993) (discussing proof of intent of
corporate employer in context of employment discrimination claim). See generally Solan, supra note 23, at
428 (“We routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group,
provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play. The legislature is a
prototypical example of the kind of group to which this process applies most naturally.”).
25
Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1314 (“The tension between textualist theory and representative government is
obvious. The textualist focusing on statutory text openly accepts, and indeed mandates, arrival at a result
that may often be inconsistent with any notion of what the legislature actually intended.”); see Solan, supra
note 23, at 431-32 (“[N]ot taking this sort of information into account increases the likelihood of a court's
accepting an interpretation that is absurdly at odds with the intentions of the enacting legislature.”).
Textualism’s methods for resolving the inevitable ambiguities in statutory language are no better a solution
for dealing with unknown compromises among representatives or hidden motivations behind votes than any
other interpretive method. Zeppos, supra at 1322. Both strict textualist interpretation and intentionalist
methods such as reliance on legislative history are subject to manipulation in support of the result the
interpreter favors. Id. at 1323 (“Statutory language has no single or objective meaning. It, like legislative
history, is subject to ‘manipulation’ (or, perhaps more accurately, interpretation). The textualist’s claim
that he alone is loyal to the true meaning of the text, while others are engaged in manipulation or resultoriented judging, involves no small amount of hubris.”) (footnote omitted); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549, 595-96
(2002) (“[S]trict textualism wraps judicial discretion in the guise of ‘just’ reading the text. Hence, it allows
judges to make policy choices sub rosa, without either the cognitively valuable exercise of justification or
the restraining mindset of a faithful agent seeking to implement the goals of the legislative principal.”).
26
See Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1331 (“The textualist is correct that legislative history does not pass
through the article I procedures for making law, but as its name connotes, legislative history is nonetheless
a product of the legislature. Through judicial resort to legislative history, Congress and its members have
been able to exert continuing influence over policymaking decisions that arise after the enactment of the
statute.”); see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845, 869-72 (1992) (noting conflicting nature of canons of construction, absence of justification
for some of them, and failure of canons to meet expectations of or provide guidance to legislators or those
affected by legislation). Many years ago, Karl Llewellyn pointed out that conflicting canons of
construction exist on almost every question. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
For a collection of criticism and support of Llewellyn on this issue, see Frank B. Cross, The Significance of
Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1978 (2007).
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and congressional subject matter experts whose ideas are reflected in committee reports
and other basic legislative history materials, so looking to these sources makes sense.27
Despite all the conflicting views about interpretation, there is currently some
convergence among textualists and intentionalists in looking first to text and then making
cautious use of background materials; accordingly, the textualist-intentionalist divide
may be overstated.28 A limited use of legislative history, one that relies on committee
reports and focuses on matters that the drafters of the reports viewed with consensus, is
an intentionalist method that sparks the least resistance from the textualists.29 Moreover,

27

See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when
discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute . . . has bipartisan support and has been carefully
considered by committees familiar with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately
rely on the views of the committee members in casting their votes. . . . [S]ince most Members are content
to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is
properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress.”); Solan, supra note 23, at 449 (“It may be true that
many who voted for a bill did so because the party leadership told them to, or because the bill contained
some benefit for people in their district, or for some other reason having nothing to do with what the bill's
authors and planners had in mind. Nonetheless, the bill’s planners gave it content. When disputes arise, it
would be odd for a member who voted for the bill without knowing what was in it to complain that the
court was looking at the details of the planning process . . . .”); see also Breyer, supra note 26, at 859-60
(1992) (noting that top officials of most large institutions rely on staff to write documents that are fairly
viewed as true reflections of institutional positions); cf. id. at 855-56 (1992) (discussing example of
statements of floor leaders reflecting purposes of various interests and constituencies on complex
bankruptcy legislation).
28
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2006); id., at 38
(“[V]irtually all interpreters today—both self-proclaimed textualists and purposivists—tend to exclude
legislative history if the text, in context, otherwise is clear.”) (collecting sources); Caleb Nelson, What Is
Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (“[N]o ‘textualist’ favors isolating statutory language from its
surrounding context, and no critic of textualism believes that statutory text is unimportant.”) (footnotes
omitted). Contemporary textualists do not resist the call to look at the broad historical context of a statute
to give meaning to the text. See Molot, supra, at 35 (“[M]odern textualists may criticize strong
purposivism for giving too much weight to context, and for emphasizing certain kinds of context
(legislative history) that textualists think should be off limits, but modern textualists do not, in principle,
object to the notion that judges should look to context as well as text.”) (collecting sources). As Molot
notes, even “textualists will sometimes use legislative history to gain a background understanding of the
problems Congress was trying to address.” Id. at 39 (collecting sources).
29
See Molot, supra note 28, at 3-4 (“[S]ome textualists will look to legislative history not to glean the
intent of a statute’s authors, but rather for the more modest purpose of providing a background
understanding of the problems Congress was trying to address. . . . The legislative history question remains
open, but it no longer is important enough to warrant the attention that it has received in the past It
certainly is not important enough to sustain a full-blown scholarly debate.”) (notes omitted); see also Bell,
supra note 13, at 84-88 (defending use of selected legislative history, relying on arguments drawn from
textualist ideas).
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both intentionalists and textualists defer to the interpretive regulations of the
administrative entity charged by the legislature with enforcing the statute.30 Employing a
restrained use of intentionalist technique, this Article will examine legislative text,
authoritative legislative history, the terms of enforcing agency regulations, and historical
context in discussing the meaning of the ADA’ reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship language.
B.

THE STATUTORY TEXT
The ADA bans “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or

mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity.”31 The ADA does not define “reasonable accommodation.”32 Instead, it
lists examples of what the term may include. For purposes of employment, reasonable
accommodation:

30

Thus, both judges associated with textualism and those associated with intentionalism endorse the rule of
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), regarding deferral to administrative
agencies charged by Congress with the administration of a statute. Chevron states that a court is required to
ask whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question,” and must follow clear congressional
intent. Id. at 842. If the statute is “ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
31
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2010). The statutory provision has a subsection (B), which further
defines forbidden discrimination to include “denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the
employee or applicant.” § 12112(b)(5)(B). Title I of the ADA defines unlawful discrimination to include a
variety of other things as well, such as limiting, segregating, or classifying job applicants or employees in
ways that adversely affect their status or opportunities on the basis of disability, engaging in disparate
impact discrimination, and improperly using employment tests. § 12112(b)(1), (6)-(7).
32
Even those who disagree with this proposition seem ultimately to change their minds when they consider
the text and structure of the law. See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 148 (2d Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (“[T]he ADA contains a definition of ‘reasonable accommodation.’ [citing
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)] However, this definition explains only the sorts of modifications and assistance that
are included within the phrase “reasonable accommodation” and provides no guidance as to whether, or to
what extent, the cost[s] of such items are relevant to a determination of their reasonableness.”).
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may include— (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.33
Some of these accommodations are material in nature: provision of equipment or
architectural modifications, for example. Others are mandatory departures from neutral
employer practices, such as employers’ scheduling demands, allocation of duties among
workers, and training protocols. In the text of the ADA, Congress buttressed its
requirement that employers depart from otherwise neutral rules by prohibiting standards,
criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of
disability,34 and outlawing qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out a person or persons with disabilities unless
the qualification standard, test, or other selection criterion, is shown to be job-related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.35 So not only may a
variance or departure from an otherwise neutral rule or practice be required as a matter of
reasonable accommodation,36 the neutral rule itself may be illegal when applied to an

33

42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2010).
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (West 2010).
35
§ 12112(b)(6).
36
Commentators have emphasized this point. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral Employer Policies
and the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 1, 17 (2002) (“[I]mplicit in reasonable accommodation is the notion that policies may have to be
changed, whether they be neutral policies or not. Employers . . . have a duty to alter the work environment,
even if the employee . . . does not measure the same as the employee without a disability under faciallyneutral criteria.”).
34
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applicant or employee with a disability if it has a discriminatory effect or unjustified
negative impact.
Unlike reasonable accommodation, “undue hardship” receives a statutory
definition. It means “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of [specified] factors . . . .”37 The factors include the nature and cost
of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the facility involved, the number
of persons employed there, the effect on expenses and resources or the other impact of
the accommodation on the facility’s operation, the overall financial strength of the
employer, the number of its employees, the number, type, and location of its facilities,
and, finally, the type of operation of the employer, including the composition, structure
and functions of the work force, geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the relevant facility to the employer.38 The statute places the burden of
demonstrating undue hardship on the employer: The duty to accommodate applies
“unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”39 The text and
structure of the statute suggest a substantial obligation to provide accommodation up to
the limit of hardship demonstrated by the employer.
C.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the unreasonable accommodation and undue hardship

provision is extensive. Several features stand out: the intent by Congress to adopt
interpretations of similar language in the regulations promulgated under section 504 of

37

42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A) (West 2010).
§ 12111(10)(B).
39
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2010).
38
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the Rehabilitation Act;40 the nature and strength of the accommodation duty Congress
meant to impose and the characteristics of the hardship defense; and the treatment of
employer practices that are neutral on their face.
1. The Relationship to Section 504’s Regulations. The legislative history of the
reasonable accommodations-undue hardship provision of the ADA is partly a regulatory
history of an earlier statute. The accommodation requirement originated in the
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids
disability discrimination by recipients of federal funding.41 These final rules became
effective June 3, 1977.42
Like the ADA, which drew on its language thirteen years later, the section 504
regulations obliged employers who received federal funds “to make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations” of a qualified person with a
disability “unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its program.”43 As with the ADA, reasonable
accommodation was not defined, but examples were provided: making facilities used by
employees readily accessible and usable; undertaking job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules; acquiring or modifying equipment or devices; providing
interpreters or readers; “and other similar actions.”44 The section 504 regulations, unlike
the ADA, also lacked a clear definition of undue hardship, but as with the ADA factors to
be considered were specified as the overall size of the recipient’s program with regard to

40

Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2010)).
29 U.S.C.A. 794(a) (West 2010).
42
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from
Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (May 4, 1977).
43
42 Fed. Reg. 22680 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a)).
44
Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)).
41
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number of employees; number and type of facilities and size of budget; the type of the
operation, including composition and structure of the workforce; and the nature and cost
of the accommodation needed.45
2. Standards for Accommodations. Congress intended to incorporate the section
504 regulations’ standards for reasonable accommodation and undue hardship into the
ADA.46 The ADA’s congressional supporters recognized that the costs of
accommodations might be high. They noted that “expensive accommodations” such as
“readers for blind persons, interpreters for deaf persons, and physical accommodations
for those with mobility impairments” would be required.47 Personal attendants, both
during the workday and while an employee traveled on business, might also be a
mandatory accommodation.48 Some accommodations that could involve disruption to
standard operating procedures were specified as examples: constant shifts rather than
day-night rotations for an employee with epilepsy; extra unpaid leave days to receive
medical treatment or for recuperation (in an era before the Family and Medical Leave

45

Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)). The President directed HEW to coordinate the rulemaking
for all other federal agencies, specifying that thy were to issue regulations consistent with those HEW
adopted. Coordination of Federal Agency Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (Jan. 13, 1978).
46
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The ADA
incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would
result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”). Congress also imposed a duty of reasonable
accommodation for individuals with disabilities in the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B)-(C) (2000).
47
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 315 (also noting that costs
of accommodations may be exaggerated); see also id. at 71-72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 354
(discussing with approval case in which court required employer to provide reader to applicant with
dyslexia for test for entry into training program for heavy equipment operator).
48
Id. at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346 (“As with readers and interpreters, the provision of an
attendant to assist a person with a disability during parts of the workday may be a reasonable
accommodation depending on the circumstances of the individual case. Attendants may, for example, be
required for traveling and other job-related functions. This issue must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis
to determine whether an undue hardship is created by providing attendants.”).
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Act49); and modified schedules for persons with mobility impairments who depend on
inaccessible public transportation.50
As the last example indicates, Congress intended that accommodations not be
limited to those that begin and end at the employer’s job site. In a detailed discussion of
the reasonable accommodation requirement, the House Education and Labor Committee
considered the additional example of a job applicant who could not get to a store located
in a mall that has no accessible entrance. The Committee stated: “The store should take
the person’s application and determine if the person is qualified for the job. The question
then becomes whether, with reasonable accommodation, the person can get to the job
site. This reasonable accommodation, of course, has an undue hardship limitation.”51
But unless the hardship on the employer is undue, the law requires the employer to
provide accommodations to make it possible for employees with disabilities to get to
work.
Moreover, as that interpretation and many of the others suggest, the drafters
recognized that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are not separate terms but
two sides of the same coin: “As set forth in the substantive section of the Act, of course,
the legal obligation of an entity to provide such an accommodation is depending on
whether the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the entity’s
business.”52 The minority members of the committee voting out the bill commented with

49

The Family and Medical Leave Act was enacted in 1993. It guarantees long-term employees in public
agencies and larger private companies up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year for specified medical and
family purposes. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 2010)).
50
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 62-63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. Congress also
emphasized that the obligation was substantial by declaring it to be “significantly higher” than the duty to
provide reasonable accommodations for religion under title VII. id. at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 350; see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 36, at 5.
51
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 61, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343.
52
Id. at 57-58, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339-40.
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approval that in the final draft, “The linkage between reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship was . . . clarified so that any duty of reasonable accommodation is limited
by the concept of undue hardship.”53
Judicial interpretations of section 504 in the years preceding adoption of the ADA
embraced the interpretation of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as two
sides of the same coin. Prewitt v. United States Postal Service involved a Vietnam
veteran whose wounds limited the ability to lift items over his head without pain.54
Among his claims were that the Postal Service had to provide him the accommodation of
lowering the ledge on which mail was stacked or giving him a handle device to reach the
higher shelves.55 The court reversed a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff
and said that on remand,
If the issue of reasonable accommodation is raised, the agency must then
be prepared to make a further showing that accommodation cannot
reasonably be made that would enable the . . . applicant to perform the
essentials of the job adequately and safely; in this regard, the Postal
Service must “demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its program.”56
In Mantolete v. Bolger, the Postal Service refused to hire an applicant with
epilepsy on account of the assumption that she would be exposed to a greater risk of
injury.57 The court overturned a grant of summary judgment to the employer, adopting
Prewitt’s analysis and treating the absence of a reasonable accommodation as an
53

Id. at 165, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 443.
662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
55
Id. at 305, 310 n.25.
56
Id. at 310 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a))
57
767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
54
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affirmative defense, which equates that concept to undue hardship.58 The court declared
that “the burden of persuasion in proving inability to accommodate remains on the
employer.”59 It said that “once the employer presents credible evidence that
accommodation would not reasonably be possible, the plaintiff has the burden of coming
forward with evidence concerning her individual capabilities and suggestions for possible
accommodations to rebut the employer’s evidence.”60
Congress relied on these judicial interpretations when it enacted the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship provisions of the ADA.61 As noted, the legislative
history supports the conclusion that Congress meant courts to follow the interpretations
of section 504 when construing the ADA. Moreover, in 1992, before an ADA caselaw
independent of section 504 emerged, Congress amended section 504 to conform the
interpretation of the employment provisions of that statute and those under ADA title I.62
3. Standards for Undue Hardship. Accommodations that are not reasonable
because they constitute an undue hardship are those that require “significant difficulty or

58

Id. at 1423.
Id. at 1424.
60
Id.; see also Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989) (“An unreasonable accommodation is
one which would impose undue hardship on the operation of its program.”) (internal quotation omitted);
.Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (“An accommodation is not reasonable, and
will therefore not be required, if, for instance, it imposes an undue hardship on the operation of the federal
employer”).
61
Prewitt is cited with approval in the title I legislative history with regard to both undue hardship and
discriminatory qualification standards. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465. Mantolete is cited with approval in title I’s legislative history on the issue of the
defense based on a direct threat to safety. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339. Judge Newman pointed out that Mantolete and Prewitt adopt the two-sides-of-thesame-coin approach to reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch.
Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (“The Ninth Circuit appears to equate
“reasonable accommodation” with the absence of “undue hardship,” viewing these concepts as opposite
sides of the same coin. . . . A similar approach appears to be taken by the Fifth Circuit.”).
62
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-569, § 506, 106 Stat. 4429 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(d)).
59
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expense,” something that varies with the nature and size of the employer’s operations.63
The legislative history states that small enterprises may have limited obligations, but a
large school district “might be required to make available a teacher’s aide to a blind
applicant for a teaching job,” and a state welfare agency might have to expend the
resources to hire an interpreter for a deaf employee.64 The reality that accommodations
such as architectural modifications or shared assistive devices benefit more than one
employee is an additional factor to be considered against a finding of undue hardship.65
The availability of outside funding also counts against undue hardship; if the employee
pays for part of the accommodation, only the employer’s share should be considered for
undue hardship.66 The committee rejected deeming the cost of an accommodation above
10% of an employee’s salary as undue hardship per se, believing that the more flexible
approach of the section 504 regulations was superior.67 The committee endorsed Nelson
v. Thornburgh,68 a section 504 case in which, as the committee described it, a group of
state welfare workers who were blind requested accommodations whose costs were

63

42 U.S.C. § 1211(10)(A) (2000). Robert Burgdorf, who drafted the original Americans with Disabilities
Act bill introduced in Congress in 1988, traced the origin of the “significant” language and said it may have
originated in a report for a proposal to distinguish disability accommodation from religious accommodation
by using the term “significant hardship” for the former. The committee stated that hardship would excuse
the making of an accommodation only if it was “exceeding or violating propriety or fitness: excessive,
immoderate, or unwarranted.” Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 463 n. 249
(1991) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-316, at 8 n.5 (1979)).
64
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350.
65
Id. at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 351 (“For example, a ramp installed for a new employee
who uses a wheelchair not only benefits that employee but will also benefit mobility-impaired applicants
and employees in the future. Assistive devices for hearing and visually-impaired persons may be shared by
more than one employee . . . . ”). For an illuminating discussion of the side benefits of accommodations on
employees with disabilities and those without, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 839, 841-42 (2008) (discussing improved supervisory practices and other examples). As the
ramp and communication devices examples suggest, the Committee was not separating reasonableness of
the accommodation from undue hardship, to whatever extent the relevant determination might depend on
costs and benefits.
66
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 351-52.
67
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464.
68
567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
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“substantial,” including the use of readers, Braille forms, and a computer capable of
handling data in Braille. Since the costs were only a small fraction of the agency’s
personnel budget, the accommodations were not an undue hardship.69 Significantly, this
is not a cost-benefits comparison, but rather a costs-total budget comparison. The
drafters of the ADA rejected the use of cost-benefit analysis in framing the reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship term.70
4. Treatment of Neutral Rules. The legislative history displays an awareness of
the discriminatory effects of neutral rules, and the need to make departures from neutral

69

H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464.
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915:002, at question 45 (Oct. 17, 2002) (“Neither the statute nor
the legislative history supports a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a specific accommodation
causes an undue hardship. Whether the cost of a reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship
depends on the employer's resources, not on the individual's salary, position, or status (e.g., full-time versus
part-time, salary versus hourly wage, permanent versus temporary).”) (footnote omitted), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html; see, e.g., Gregory Crespi, Efficiency Rejected:
Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 4
(1990) (“[T]he language of the statute, its legislative history, and the inapplicability in the disability
employment accommodation context of the key premises underlying the efficiency orientation all indicate
that little if any weight should be given to efficiency considerations in determining the availability of the
undue hardship defense for ADA-covered employers.”); id. at 23 (noting that policy emerging from section
504 caselaw interpretations embodied in ADA, “indicates that a reasonable accommodation must be made,
regardless of the size of benefits that will result, so long as the cost of the accommodation is not unduly
large relative to the overall financial capacity of the employer.”); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 2226; id. at 32 (“[R]easonable accommodation under the ADA. . . requires more than efficient reductions of
risk, since it demands equal opportunity for the disabled, although in a form limited by the employer's
ability to bear the cost of accommodation . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without
Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1895, 1907 (2007) (“[A]n accommodation might be required under the ADA even if its costs
outweigh its benefits . . . . The ADA does not enact Messrs[.] Kaldor and Hicks’s understanding of
economic efficiency.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1898 (criticizing judicial approach that uses costbenefit analysis to determine reasonableness of accommodation without considering text, history, or
structure of ADA). But see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations,
53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003) (employing cost-benefit balancing in analyzing reasonableness of accommodations
under ADA; collecting and analyzing judicial and academic sources that support cost-benefit approaches).
Some writers criticize the ADA for its failure to mandate cost-benefit analysis for accommodations. See,
e.g., Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND
WORK: RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed. 1991) (“The central flaw of the ADA is in
the imposition n employers of a duty to accommodate the mental or physical limitations of the disabled
worker or applicant without weighing the expected benefits of such accommodation . . . .”); cf. Issacharoff
& Nelson, supra note 8, at 344-45 (“[T]he extent of the accommodation standard is defined not by a
uniform obligation across all employers, but by the ability of any employer to pay, regardless of fault or
ensuing competitive disadvantage.”).
70
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rules as a matter of providing accommodations.71 The House Committee explained that
variances from neutral rules such as set work schedules or rotations of day and night
shifts, or provision of extra unpaid leave days, may be mandatory accommodations if
they do not cause the employer undue hardship.72 The congressional understanding
matched a 1983 report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, which had
stressed the need to address the problems posed by employers’ standard operating
procedures and conventional modes of operation on people with disabilities.73 Congress
manifested a similar awareness of the difficulty with uniformly applied, neutral policies
and practices of employers by explaining that a “facially neutral” qualification standard,
test, or employee selection criterion with a negative effect on people with disabilities is
discriminatory unless the employer can show that it is job-related and consistent with
business necessity and enacting a prohibition on this form of disparate impact
discrimination, as well as requiring reasonable accommodation up to the limit of undue
hardship.74
Departures from rules that apply to everyone else may be viewed as preferences,
which suggests an analogy to racial preferences embodied in some affirmative action
programs. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, a 1979 section 504 case
concerning accommodations in the training program for a student nurse who was deaf,
71

S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 37-38 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 105 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 388 (discussing public accommodation provisions).
72
See supra text accompanying note 50.
73
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 102 (1983)
(“Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are
always structured in the ways people with “normal” physical and mental abilities customarily undertake
them. Adjustments or modifications of opportunities to permit handicapped people to participate fully have
been broadly termed ‘reasonable accommodation.’”). This report, whose drafters included the person who
wrote the original ADA bill, provided a “statutory blueprint” for what eventually became the ADA. Robert
L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R.
241, 244 (2008).
74
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465; see 42 U.S.C.A. §
12112(b)(3), (6) (West 2010).
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the Supreme Court upheld rejecting the student from the program despite her claim that it
could be modified to accommodate her. 75 The Court said that accommodations of close,
individual attention by an instructor to guarantee patient safety during the clinical portion
of the nursing program and waiver of required courses amounted to “affirmative action”
and were more than the statute intended.76
But in a subsequent case, Alexander v. Choate,77 the Court clarified the distinction
Davis sought to make between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action, stating
that Davis meant to exclude from mandatory accommodations only those that make
fundamental alterations in programs, which is essentially the undue hardship standard
embodied in the ADA.78 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that its use of the term
“affirmative action” in discussing section 504 failed to recognize the difference between
affirmative action to remediate past discrimination and accommodation to eliminate
obstacles to inclusion.79 It then said:
Regardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it is clear from
the context of Davis that the term “affirmative action” referred to those
“changes,” “adjustments,” or “modifications” to existing programs that

75

442 U.S. 397 (1979). The question arose in the context of whether the student was an “otherwise
qualified individual” protected by section 504, given the impossibility of using lipreading skills in portions
of the training program and registered nursing practice, for the evidence indicated that voice was
sometimes the only way to communicate immediate demands for instruments or medications, and masks
had to be worn during surgery and in other settings. Id. at 403, 405-06.
76
Id. at 409-10. The Court conceded that “the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action
and illegal discrimination” will not “always be clear.”
77
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
78
Id. at 300 (“Davis . . . struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated
into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs:
while a grantee need not be required to make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ modifications to accommodate
the handicapped, it may be required to make ‘reasonable’ ones.”).
79
Id. at 300 n.20 (citing Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982); Mark E. Martin, Note,
Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 885-886 (1980); Donald Jay Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:
Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 185-186 (1980)).
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would be “substantial,” or that would constitute “fundamental alteration[s]
in the nature of a program . . . ,” rather than to those changes that would be
reasonable accommodations.80
The bottom line is thus an obligation of reasonable accommodation up to a limit of undue
hardship, in which the undue hardship standard means substantial or fundamental change
in programs, and a retreat from using the term “affirmative action” to describe disability
accommodations. Notably, the legislative history of the ADA cites Choate and
completely omits any mention of Davis.81 The drafters of the ADA were aware of
Choate, and they could hardly have failed to notice that it altered Davis’s understanding
of some accommodations as forbidden affirmative action. But they chose simply to
ignore Davis and instead to cite Choate.82
D.

AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
Under Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., courts must

defer to the interpretation of a statute by an agency that it is charged with enforcing, as
80

Id.
The references to Choate are in the portions dealing with the government services portion of the statute,
as might be expected since Choate concerned the scope of coverage provided under a state Medicaid
program. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30, 61, 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 312,
343, 367. Congress also acted to bury the Davis case by enacting a definition of mandatory auxiliary aids
and services that potentially could have kept the student nurse in her program. See Timothy M. Cook, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 393, 428-29 (1991) (“To
avoid similar misinterpretations of the ADA, Congress added a subsection to the definition of “auxiliary
aids and services” to clarify that the Act does include the accommodation requirements disallowed by
Justice Powell.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
82
In School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987), the Court repeated Choate’s understanding of
what Davis said about accommodations, and then went on to state that “Employers have an affirmative
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee,” id. at 288 n.19 (emphasis
added). References to Arline are also sprinkled throughout the ADA legislative history, although typically
in contexts other than interpreting the meaning of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, which is
understandable because Arline primarily dealt with coverage under section 504 of an individual with a
contagious disease. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30 (discussing nature of disability discrimination),
53 (discussing definition of disability), 57 (discussing direct-threat standard), 76 (same), (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 312, 335, 339, 359; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 30 (discussing definition of
disability), 34 (discussing direct-threat standard) , 45 (same) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453, 457, 468; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(IV), at 37 (discussing direct-threat standard), 82 (dissenting views
concerning definition of disability) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 526, 564.
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long as the agency interpretation is a reasonable one.83 Congress charged the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission with enforcing title I of the ADA.84 The
interpretations of the words “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”
advanced by the EEOC reinforce the idea that emerges from the legislative history that
the duty placed on employers is not a modest burden but a serious one, and further
support the two-sides-of-the-same-coin approach. Both the regulations and the
interpretive guidance documents issued by the EEOC demonstrate these propositions.
1. The EEOC Regulations. With regard to reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship, the EEOC regulations for title I of the ADA repeat the prohibition in the statute,
stating that it is unlawful for covered entities to fail to make reasonable accommodations
unless they can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the business operations of the employer.85 Like the statute, the regulations rely more on
example or typology than definition when discussing reasonable accommodation.
Reasonable accommodations are (1) modifications or adjustments to a job application
process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for a desired
83

467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, . . . [and] the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”) (footnotes omitted). This proposition is often the beginning of the argument
not its end, because if a statutory term is unclear, the agency interpretation may be as well. Additional
problems with the application of Chevron abound. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 19 n.77 (“Of course,
big questions remain regarding how courts go about applying Chevron.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E.
Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Agency Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J.
1051, 1068-72 (1995) (discussing when to resort to agency interpretation under Chevron). But congruence
between the meaning assigned by the enforcing agency and the meaning derived from other sources
provides good support for a proposed interpretation.
84
42 U.S.C.A. § 12116 (West 2010).
85
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2009). The following subsection repeats the statutory prohibition on denying
employment opportunities to otherwise qualified applicants or employees with disabilities based on the
need to make reasonable accommodations. § 1630.9(b). Other subsections provide that failure to receive
technical assistance is no excuse for failure to accommodate, and that a person with a disability need not
accept an accommodation but may lose the status of a qualified individual if unable to perform the essential
functions of the job without the accommodation. § 1630.9(c)-(d).
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position; (2) modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or the manner or
circumstances under which the position is customarily performed, that enable the
individual to perform the position’s essential functions; or (3) modifications or
adjustments that enable an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and
privileges or employment as are enjoyed by the employer’s other similarly situated
employees who do not have disabilities.86 The regulations save their definitional
language for undue hardship, essentially tracking the statute.87 The regulations
specifically list difficulties imposed on co-workers not as part of what may make an
accommodation unreasonable but as part of what may make hardship undue for the
employer.88
86

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
88
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2009) (including with “factors to be considered” in “determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship” on the employer “the impact on the ability
of other employees to perform their duties”). As Professor Anderson notes, many accommodations might
be expected to impose some hardship on co-workers. Anderson, supra note 36, at 36 (“[N]ot only
reassignment, but other accommodations as well, such as modification of work schedules, job restructuring,
and the like . . . intrude[] upon the expectations of other employees.”). But these hardships are relevant to
ADA cases only insofar as they may cause undue hardship on the employer. For a contrary view, which is
supported in part by the Supreme Court’s decision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400
(2002), see Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent Third
Parties,” 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 901 (2003) (arguing that reasonableness of accommodations hinges in part
on effects on other employees and proposing that accommodations requiring any adverse employment
action with regard to other employees be considered not reasonable). Professor Long acknowledges that
the undue hardship provision focuses on hardship to employers, not co-employees. Id. at 904. Although
his view about reasonable accommodation can claim consistency with title VII interpretations and some
virtue as a bright-line rule, the contention of this Article is that it gives an incorrect meaning to reasonable
accommodation independent from undue hardship and would inappropriately freeze the interpretation of
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, rather than leaving development of that term to juries over
time. Title VII, of course, lacks a reasonable accommodation term except as applied to religion cases, and
the term there has a different meaning than that in the ADA, as Professor Long notes. Long, supra, at 900
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350). Moreover, title
VII protects from discrimination all individuals of whatever race, color, sex, religion, or national origin,
while the ADA protects only persons with disabilities. See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA
Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439,
440 (2002) (stressing importance of contrast); Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in
Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, The Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Law, 78 OR. L.
REV. 27, 68 (1999) (noting, perhaps with understatement, that “The ADA Is More Complicated than Title
VII and the ADEA”). As a matter of policy, the focus on co-worker burdens also ignores the benefits to
co-workers that may flow when employers generalize accommodations such as telecommuting or
ergonomic workplaces. See Emens, supra note 65, at 841.
87
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2. The Interpretive Guidance. The EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance sheds further
light on the meaning of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.89 The Guidance
places a strong emphasis on equality of opportunity, defined as “an opportunity to attain
the same level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits and privileges of
employment as are available to the average similarly situated employee without a
disability.”90 The Guidance stresses that the employer’s overall resources have to be
considered in the undue hardship determination: “To demonstrate that the cost of an
accommodation poses an undue hardship, an employer would have to show that the cost
is undue as compared to the employer’s budget.”91 A simple comparison of the
accommodation’s cost to the salary of the employee is not adequate.92 The analysis is not
a cost-benefits analysis of the accommodation. The costs are to be balanced against the
available resources of the employer, not against the benefits of the particular
accommodation, much less the marginal economic contribution of the employee.93
The EEOC’s original Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship elaborates further on the meaning of reasonable accommodation: “The
statutory definition of reasonable accommodation does not include any quantitative,

89

The Supreme Court views EEOC interpretations of this type as less than controlling authority, but notes
that they “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (referring to title VII
guidelines); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, . . . are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),
but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade,’ ibid.”). At the very least, then
the EEOC’s interpretation is subject to Skidmore deference. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 903-08 (2001) (distinguishing proper situations for greater
deference under Chevron and lesser deference under Skidmore and collecting authorities).
90
ADA Title I EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App., § 1630.9 (2008).
91
Id. § 1630 App., § 1630.15(d) (2008).
92
Id.
93
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 70, at question 45.
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financial, or other limitations regarding the extent of the obligation to make changes to a
job or work environment.”94 The interpretation continues:
The only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation to provide
“reasonable accommodation” is that no such change or modification
is required if it would cause “undue hardship” on the employer.
Undue hardship addresses quantitative, financial, or other limitations on
an employer's ability to provide reasonable accommodation.95
The EEOC deleted the boldface font of the first sentence when it revised the Guidance in
2002, but retained its language, and merely substituted a more detailed description of
undue hardship for the one in the original.96
E.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As noted above, even the most adamant of textualists take note of the historical

context in which laws are passed.97 In 1988-90, when the ADA was written and enacted,
there were social developments that affected everyone, but in particular would have been
in the consciousness of the members of Congress who drafted and voted on the ADA.
94

EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 1999 WL 33305876, at “General Principles” (1999) (hereinafter, “1999 EEOC
Reasonable Accommodation Guidance”). This Guidance was modified after the Supreme Court’s decision
in US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 70, at
“Purpose.” The original document is used here because it may provide a better indication of the original
meaning of the Act than the Supreme Court’s comments in Barnett. See infra text accompanying notes
194-226 (discussing Barnett), but as noted below the changes are not consequential.
95
1999 EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, supra note 94. See generally Carrie Griffin Basas,
Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 111 (2008) (discussing EEOC Guidance).
96
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, supra note 70, at “General Principles.” (“The only statutory limitation on an
employer's obligation to provide ‘reasonable accommodation’ is that no such change or modification is
required if it would cause ‘undue hardship’ to the employer. ‘Undue hardship’ means significant difficulty
or expense and focuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the
cost or difficulty of providing a specific accommodation.”).
97
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing study of contemporary social context in
interpreting statutory terms).
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Three developments to note are the excitement over technological advances, the recent
emergence of the social model of disability, and the rise of a popular movement in
support of disability civil rights.
1. Technology. The era displayed an overwhelming optimism over technology
and how it would improve the world. Many developments taken for granted today were
just emerging and appeared full of promise: The Apple Macintosh, often recognized as
the first fully successful personal computer, debuted in 1984;98 email came into wide use
in 1990, and people soon began talking about the World Wide Web.99 Mobile telephones
went from brick-like to pocket-sized around the same time.100 These technological
changes affected the expectations for disability accommodations. New high-tech
adaptations of the late 1980s included telecommunications advances as well as software
and hardware to assist individuals with mobility, sensory, and orthopedic impairments.101
Assistive technology for people with disabilities was likely to be particularly prominent
in the minds of members of Congress interested in disability issues at the time of the
ADA’s passage, for Congress in 1987 amended the Developmental Disabilities

98

See Macintosh, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Macintosh (visited Feb. 7, 2009).
Though one may be skeptical of their authoritativeness on various matters, Wikipedia and similar sources
seem particularly apt as a source on the evolution of computers and the Internet and the popular
expectations thus engendered.
99
See The History of Email, Thinkquest, http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/00047/email.htm (visited Feb.
7, 2009); History of the World Wide Web, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_World_Wide_Web (visited Feb. 7, 2009). The first major
action-thriller about the Internet, punningly titled “The Net,” did not appear until 1995. See Internet Movie
Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113957/ (visited Dec. 1, 2008).
100
See History of Mobile Phones, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_mobile_phones
(visited Feb. 7, 2009); see also Matt Richtel, Promoting the Car Phone, Despite Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/technology/07distracted.html?_r=1&hp
(describing event at Soldier Field in Chicago in 1983 launching mass-market cellphone service).
101
Notably, an entire title of the ADA, title IV, is devoted to telecommunications for persons with
disabilities. 47 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West 2010). Federal legislation to promote assistive technology was first
passed in 1988, amended in 1994, then replaced by the Assistive Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105394, 112 Stat. 3627 (1998). Nat’l Ctr. on Accessible Info. Tech., What Is Assistive Technology?, at
http://www.washington.edu/accessit/articles?109 (visited Aug. 28, 2009).
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Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to include provisions for assistive technology102 and in
1988 enacted the Technology-Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act.103
If technology was expected to make life in general easier, it certainly was expected to
make accommodating people with disabilities easier.104 Senators and Representatives
who drafted and voted on the ADA—like members of the public at large—would have
expected that technology would make accommodations that in 1990 imposed undue
hardship into the reasonable accommodations of a few years later.
2. The Social Model of Disability. The late 1980s had just seen the emergence of
the social model of disability, that is, an understanding that physical and mental
conditions themselves do not necessarily disable. Instead, disability arises from a
dynamic between physical or mental conditions and the barriers—either of environments
or attitudes—that keep people with disabilities from full participation in work and in
society.105 This model recognizes that a person using a wheelchair for mobility is not

102

See Pub. L. No. 100-146, §§ 102(16), 202 (b)(5)(B), 101 Stat. 840 (1987).
Pub. L. 100-407, 102 Stat. 1044 (1988). The Act was sponsored by Representative Jeffords and Senator
Harkin. Patricia A. Morrissey & Robert Silverstein, The Technology-Related Assistance for Individuals
with Disabilities Act of 1988, AM. REHABILITATION, Summer 1989, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0842/is_n2_v15/ai_8200899/. These legislators became two of the
prime movers behind the ADA.
104
Justice Powell recognized the impact of technology as early as 1979, though he spoke in terms of fixing
people with disabilities rather than adapting the environment. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412
(1979) (“Technological advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped
or otherwise qualify them for some useful employment.”); see also Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin.,
44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Most jobs in organizations public or private involve team work under
supervision rather than solitary unsupervised work, and team work under supervision generally cannot be
performed at home without a substantial reduction in the quality of the employee’s performance. This will
no doubt change as communications technology advances, but is the situation today.”). Some sources
confirm that technology has advanced to the point that even if Vande Zande was correct about working
from home in 1995 it is no longer correct today. See, e.g., Jennifer Tennant, The Reasonableness of
Working from Home in the Digital Age, REV. DISABILITY STUD., No. 4, 2009, at 10. See generally
Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 314-54 (discussing impact of expected technological change on accessibility).
105
See, e.g., Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction,
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 6-14 (1988) (developing and elaborating on minority
group model of people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image:
Disability and Capitalism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, at 172, 174 (Lennard J. Davis ed. 1997)
(describing Aminority-group model of disability@); see also Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal: Interrogating the
103
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disabled but for the existence of curbs, stairs, and other obstacles in the physical
environment, and the discriminatory attitudes of individuals with control over economic
and social goods.106 By identifying the environment of physical conditions and human
attitudes as the thing to be changed, the model encourages people to look for
accommodations that need to be made rather than characteristics of the person that need
to be fixed.107 The ADA, with its focus on eliminating physical and attitudinal barriers
rather than ameliorating what is “wrong” with people with disabilities, embodies the
social model.108 The whole point of the accommodation duty in the ADA is to treat the
barriers in the environment as not natural or permanent, but instead subject to removal by

Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL=Y REV.
1, 9 (1999) (AThis social-political model rejects the premise of the moral and biomedical perspectives that
disability is inherent within the individual. . . . [I]t understands disability as contextual and relational, . . .
as a broader social construct reflecting society=s dominant ideology and cultural assumptions. While it
acknowledges the existence of biologically based differences, the social-political model locates the
meaning of these differencesBand the individual=s experience of them as burdensomeBin society=s
stigmatizing attitudes and biased structures rather than in the individual.@) (footnotes omitted). Some
criticism of the model has emerged, see Adam Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1285-1306 (2007); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil
Rights, 58 Hastings L.J. 1203 (2007) (finding limits in social model and putting forward disability human
rights paradigm, which builds off social-model, development-rights, and capabilities ideas); Bonnie Poitras
Tucker, The ADA=s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335
(2001) (noting limits on civil rights approach as embodied in ADA), but others have defended the model,
see, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance, 25 GA. ST. L.
REV. 575 (2009). The Fine and Asch article may be the clearest articulation of the model in the period
before the ADA, but the idea took root ten or more years earlier and can be traced still farther back, to the
work of Professor tenBroek and others in the 1960s. See JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS
AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET 29 (2006) (“[T]he social model . . . emerged in the late 1960s and
early 1970s to challenge the medical model.”). See generally Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814-16 (1966) (urging “integrationist” rather than
“custodialist” approach to disability).
106
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
476, 480-81 (2000) (“‘Disability,’ under this conception, resides as much in the attitudes of society as in
the characteristics of the disabled individual.”).
107
See ERKULWATER, supra note 105, at 30-31 (2006) (noting importance of social model in shifting focus
of advocacy groups towards changes in social environment).
108
Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 263 (“The ADA embodies a social concept of discrimination that takes the
view that many limitations resulting from actual or perceived impairments flow, not from limitations of the
individual, but, rather, from the existence of unnecessary barriers to full participation in society and its
institutions.”); see Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 150 (2005) (“[S]ome scholars have credited the political awareness
engendered by the minority model for the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act and comparable
civil rights legislation.”) (collecting authorities).
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the provision of accommodations.109 Congress could hardly have been ignorant of the
significance of this emerging model in thinking about what would be considered a
reasonable accommodation and what would be deemed to impose undue hardship.110
3. The Social Movement. Closely connected to development two, there was a
growing social movement of people with disabilities, which Congress would have
expected to continue to change attitudes about what is considered normal and which
accommodations are usual, as opposed to extraordinary.111 The 1970s featured a wellpublicized sit-in at HEW Secretary Califano’s office and related nationwide
demonstrations to force the Carter administration to adopt final regulations to implement
section 504.112 The 1980s witnessed noisy protests over various proposed changes in
federal regulations pertaining to disability discrimination and the failure to name a deaf
president for Gallaudet University; in other places demonstrators chained their

109

See Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 265 (“The ADA is based on a social or civil rights model (sometimes
referred to as a socio-political model), in contrast to the traditional ‘medical model.’ It views the
limitations that arise from disabilities as largely the result of prejudice and discrimination rather than as
purely the inevitable result of deficits in the individual.”); see also Emens, supra note 65, at 878 (2008)
(“Disability law thus appears to flip the assimilationist demand on its head. That is, instead of demanding
that employees assimilate, disability law seems to require the environment, rather than the individual, to
change.”) (footnote omitted).
110
See Cook, supra note 81, at 441 (“Congress was well-aware in enacting the ADA that severe prejudicial
attitudes are ‘faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.’ Congress’s solution was not to maintain the
isolation of persons with disabilities but, strongly to the contrary, to ‘assur[e] equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.’”) (quoting findings
in original ADA) (footnotes omitted).
111
The militant disability rights movement is sometimes traced to Ed Roberts and other students with
physical disabilities who roomed in the hospital at University of California-Berkeley—the only residence
on campus that could accommodate them—during the late 1960s. They benefited from and demanded the
further implementation of technology to make education more accessible and they collaboratively
developed theories about disability in society. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 41-53 (1994) (discussing emergence of disability rights
movement at Berkeley). In fact, the movement stretches back much earlier, and includes the
demonstrations by the League of the Physically Handicapped against exclusion of workers with disabilities
from New Deal jobs programs. See PAUL K. LONGMORE, The League of the Physically Handicapped and
the Great Depression, in WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 53, 65-85 (2003).
112
See Cook, supra note 81, at 394 (describing sit-in at Califano’s office); Ravi Malhotra, The Politics of
the Disability Rights Movements, http://dawn.thot.net/ravi_malhotra.html (describing demonstrations in
nine cities, including Washington, D.C., where 300 demonstrators sat in at HEW for twenty-eight hours
and San Francisco, where disability advocates occupied HEW offices for twenty-five days).
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wheelchairs to public transit facilities and large numbers of disability rights lawsuits were
prosecuted.113 There was every reason to believe that the disability rights movement
would grow and cause the degree of social change that the movement for racial equality
and the women’s rights movement did in previous decades. The expectation of change of
social attitudes meant that legislators voting on the ADA had strong justification to
expect that what would have been viewed as not reasonable in 1990 would be seen as
reasonable a few years later. In fact, for Congress the ADA was itself part of an
escalating series of laws prohibiting disability discrimination, from the civil rights
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibiting disability discrimination in
federally assisted activity in general,114 to laws barring disability discrimination in the
Foreign Service,115 in unions representing federal employees,116 in programs conducted
under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act,117 in air travel,118 and in sale or
rental of housing.119 No better evidence of the growing strength of the social movement
for equal rights for persons with disabilities could possibly have been before Congress,
nor could there have been any better proof to the individuals voting on the ADA’s

113

See Burgdorf, supra note73, at 294-95 (citing additional examples as well); see also DORIS ZAMES
FLEISHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 57-70 (2001) (describing proliferation of
protests against inaccessible public transit); SHAPIRO, supra note 111, at 65-70 (also discussing additional
examples of protests); cf. OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 12559 (1989) (describing Gallaudet demonstrations).
114
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-794a (West 2010).
115
22 U.S.C.A. § 3905(b)(1) (West 2010).
116
5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(b)(4) (West 2010).
117
15 U.S.C.A. § 3151(a) (West 2010).
118
49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (West 2010).
119
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (West 2010). Federal laws against disability discrimination stretch back at
least to the 1948 enactment of a statute barring employment discrimination based on physical disability in
the Civil Service. Pub. L. No. 617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351 (1948). The Architectural Barriers Act, requiring
accessibility for federal public spaces, came into being in 1968. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4151-4157 (West 2010).
Congress viewed these laws and others as part of an accelerating trend of legislation protecting the civil
rights of people with disabilities. See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 387-90 (1991) (article describing trend by former senator
instrumental in passage of ADA).
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language that popular expectations for “reasonable” societal adaptation to the needs of
people with disabilities would grow.
It is something of a commonplace among writers on disability discrimination
topics to say that the development of the ADA has been hampered by the lack of a real
social movement behind it, that the law outstripped the social agitation needed for its
continued vitality.120 This view, however, ignores the sit-ins at Califano’s office and the
branch offices of HEW that led to the implementation of the section 504 regulations,121
the other demonstrations,122 the lawsuits, the letter-writing and telephone campaigns, and
all the other public actions that furthered disability consciousness during the period from
the 1960s to the 1980s and ultimately caused the transition from requests for charity to
demands for rights.123

120

See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 13, at 527-28 (“Without broad public support or a strong social movement
pushing to expand our notion of disabilities, it was simply too much to expect the Supreme Court to
interpret the ADA expansively, or even to construe the statute consistent with congressional intent so long
as the statute provided interpretive room for judicial discretion, which it did.”); Michael Ashley Stein,
Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579,
626 (2004) (“Unlike other marginalized minority groups, disabled Americans were empowered by civil
rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social consciousness about their circumstances and
capabilities.”). Stein notes that organizing in the period before the ADA tended to be along disabilitycategory lines, and that it has been a challenge to sustain cross-disability organizational efforts in the period
after passage. Id. at 627-28. It should also be noted that Selmi’s point is directly specifically at definitions
of disability and who is covered by the ADA. Selmi, supra at 527. The organization of disability activists
by impairment category posed difficulties for responding to judicial restrictions on the coverage of the law.
121
See Malhotra, supra note 112.
122
See id. (describing repeated disruptions of meetings of American Public Transit Association by
disability rights demonstrators and additional public transit activism).
123
Moreover, when these sources talk of an underdeveloped social movement, they are usually trying to
explain courts’ restrictive interpretations of the ADA. The reality is that even laws born out of social
movements that are thought to have been more visible or more militant also suffer limiting interpretations
from courts. This observation has been made time and again by legal scholars, notably those in the field of
labor law. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268-69 (1978) (describing limiting construction
placed on labor law by courts); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and
Other Tales, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 518, 519 (2004) (noting that in interpreting labor law, courts elevate
common law rights of employers over statutory rights of workers). Judicial conduct is a weak indicator of
the strength of the social movement behind laws.
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F.

DISTILLING A MEANING
The ADA’s text, its history, its agency interpretation, and its social context

establish three central ideas about the duty to accommodate: that reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are not separate ideas, but that undue hardship is the
limit on reasonable accommodation, its flip side; that the duty is significant, not subject
to cost-benefits balancing, but subject to ratcheting up over time; and that neutral rules
are not immune to accommodation, but instead accommodation works as a form of
preference, though one that should not be mislabeled “affirmative action”
1. Two Sides of the Same Coin. The legislative sources make clear that reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are a single concept. The words form parts of a
statutory sentence that links them together into the same statutory term. The duty to
make reasonable accommodations exists up to the limit of undue hardship. At the point
of undue hardship, the accommodation is no longer reasonable. It should be no surprise
that the ADA merely gives examples of reasonable accommodation while providing a
definition and relevant factors to consider in determining undue hardship. If undue
hardship can be determined, there is no need to define what reasonable accommodation
is. It is everything that is not undue hardship.124 Undue hardship is the laboring phrase
in the term, not reasonable accommodation. If “unreasonable accommodation” seems not
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Many scholars also note that accommodations are reasonable precisely up to the point where they
impose undue hardship, thus implicitly recognizing that the two concepts are one. See, e.g., Stein, supra
note 70, at 81 (“Title I delineates the boundary between reasonable and unreasonable as an otherwise
undefined point at which a requested accommodation engenders an ‘undue hardship’ to the providing
employer.”); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1316
(1991) (describing undue hardship as reasonable accommodation’s “twin concept”). Professor Basas
makes the point that for true equality to be achieved, it is necessary to mount resistance against the
emphasis on reasonableness of accommodations. Basas, supra note 95, at 105. She states, “Resistance
demands dropping the language of reasonableness, or at least, shifting attention from gut reactions about
reasonableness to more detailed analyses of hardship.” Id.
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to make sense, it is because reasonable accommodation lacks a meaning other than the
absence of undue hardship. The terms should be read together, and the opposite of the
one is the other. Hence the play on words to make the title of this article: There is no
such thing as unreasonable accommodation and due hardship.125
A strict textualist might nevertheless complain that this interpretation reads
“reasonable” out of the statute. But the words “reasonable” and “undue” are antonyms;
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship represent opposites of each other, two
poles of a single line. The rest of the statutory text reinforces the interpretation of
reasonable and undue as opposites: Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are
linked in the same sentence separated by an “unless,” denoting that an accommodation is
reasonable unless it produces undue hardship.126 The structure of the statute as a whole
lends further support. There is no definition of reasonable accommodation, but an
elaborate one is provided for undue hardship.127 The fact that the statute places the
burden of demonstrating undue hardship on the employer also presents a problem with
the separate-terms reading.128 Congress would not have intended the plaintiff to have the
burden on an undefined reasonableness inquiry when it specified that the employer has
the burden on its better-defined opposite. Moreover, as developed below, similar
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I acknowledge that I used “unreasonable accommodation” to mean something different in an article a
dozen years ago. Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment
Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 166 (1998). Trying to sound ironic, I used the
term then to describe a duty of accommodation greater than ordinary reasonable accommodation. Under
federal law, such a duty applies to the federal government and federal contractors, see 29 U.S.C.A. §§
791(b), 793(a) (West 2010); in the article, I argued that it should be expanded to cover a wider range of
employers and further enhanced. But like big hair, irony went out with the 1990s, and the usage never
caught on. The phrase, however, has enough power to arrest attention that it seems foolish to let it lie
unused.
126
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2010) (“not making reasonable accommodations . . . unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship . . . .”).
127
See § 12111(9).
128
See § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“not making reasonable accommodations . . . unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship . . . .”) (emphasis supplied).
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language in other parts of the ADA regarding reasonableness and burdensomeness of
accommodation has been interpreted as two sides of the same coin.129 Even rigid
textualists rely on constructions of similar language in the same statute.130
At the very least, the “reasonable” term is ambiguous, and in that case, looking to
the legislative history and regulatory agency interpretation is appropriate. The legislative
history repeatedly refers to undue hardship as the limit of reasonable accommodation
rather than a separate concept,131 and manifests the intention to adopt interpretations of
section 504 that treat reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as two sides of the
same coin.132 The original EEOC Enforcement Guidance states in boldface type: “The
only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation to provide “reasonable
accommodation” is that no such change or modification is required if it would cause
“undue hardship” on the employer.”133 If a textualist reading somehow calls for a
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See infra text accompanying notes 236-64 (discussing interpretations of ADA titles II and III).
See infra text accompanying note 264 (discussing textualist use of interpretation of similar statutory
language).
131
See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 (discussing legislative history).
132
Even some sources that ultimately adopt other conclusions about the meaning of reasonable
accommodation nevertheless agree that the legislative history supports the same-coin interpretation:
[T]here are intimations in the legislative history suggesting that some in Congress may
have viewed “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” as opposite sides of the
same coin. Though the statutory terms seem to be quite different, it is noteworthy that
the passage in the House Report on the ADA that purports to explain “reasonable
accommodation” ends up discussing the employer's burden of proving undue hardship.
See H.R. Rep. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39-42 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462-65. It is also relevant that the statutory definition of “undue
hardship” permits the employer to sustain its burden, with respect to its affirmative
defense, with evidence as to the hardship for both employers generally and the particular
employer being sued.
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 148 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring); see infra
text accompanying notes 161-68 (discussing Borkowski’s interpretation of reasonable accommodation); see
also Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc, 923 F. Supp. 720, 733 (D. Md. 1996) (adopting
different interpretation but stating, “A number of courts treat ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue
hardship’ as flip sides of the same coin, i.e., an accommodation which is reasonable does not cause an
undue hardship, and an accommodation which would cause an undue hardship would, by definition, be
unreasonable.”).
133
1999 EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, supra note 94.
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contrary interpretation, it should be rejected in favor of an intentionalist approach that
takes this evidence of meaning into account.
2. A Significant Duty, Not a Cost-Benefits Balance, and a Dynamic Obligation.
The statutory accommodation burden is a substantial one. “Hardship” means something
onerous. Moreover, the examples in the statutory text of reasonable accommodation—
making facilities accessible, restructuring jobs, acquiring equipment, and hiring new
personnel—entail effort and cost. The legislative history reinforces this reading.
Accommodations might be “expensive,”134 and plainly will disrupt routines and standard
operating procedures. Changing standard operating procedures is the gist of
accommodation, and the dominant theme in the EEOC regulations concerning the
statutory term.135
The statutory term requires balancing of accommodations’ costs, but it is a
balance with the overall and site-specific resources of the employer, not with the benefit
to the employee anything else.136 Provision of a reader for a blind public aid
caseworker137 or an aide for a blind schoolteacher138 or a personal attendant for an
employee139 could well fail an abstract cost-benefits test, but those are accommodations
Congress specifically approved.140 Required accommodations might be those needed to
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 315.
See supra text accompanying note 86 (discussing EEOC regulations). As Professor Satz points out, both
legal and philosophical arguments support requiring employers to make accommodations that enable
people with disabilities to accomplish work tasks in unorthodox manners, even if the employer would
prefer accommodations that are more conventional, as with allowing an office worker to use her feet to
manipulate objects rather than arm prostheses, if that is easier for her. Satz, supra note 8, at 266.
136
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(B) (West 2010).
137
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464.
138
Id. at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350.
139
Id. at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346.
140
The statutory text specifically lists “qualified readers or interpreters” as mandatory accommodations. 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111(9) (West 2010).
135
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get to work, not just those on the worksite.141 The reasonable accommodation-undue
hardship determination entails close attention to the specific facts about particular
employees or applicants and workplaces.142 More will be expected of wealthier or larger
employers.143 This fact alone means that precedent about one employer being excused
from providing an accommodation should not be used to permit another employer, which
may have more resources or different needs, to deny the accommodation.
It also is clear that the burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that will change
over time depending on what courts and juries consider appropriate as technology and
social expectations change. If the social context of the statute has any significance at all,
it is that accommodations that seemed beyond the pale yesterday will be considered
ordinary tomorrow. As Professors Karlan and Rutherglen noted, the accommodations
determination process “resembles, in some important respects, the common-law process
of developing and applying standards of negligence.”144 The use of juries is a
particularly apt means to be certain that the law conforms to widespread understandings
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See supra text accompanying note 51.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (noting that ADA requires case-by-case
determinations); Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 8, at 337 (“[A]llowing cases to proceed to the reasonable
accommodation inquiry pushes inexorably toward the fact-intensive case-by-case analysis.”).
143
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(B) (West 2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 92-93
(discussing EEOC Guidance).
144
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 31; see id. at 32 (“More broadly, the substantive standard for
reasonable accommodation, the wide range of factors that are relevant to the issue of undue hardship, and
the procedures for enforcement through individual claims in court, all suggest an analogy to the law of
negligence.”). But see id. at 32 (noting that reasonable accommodation, unlike negligence, “requires more
than efficient reductions of risk”); see also Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 8, at 352 (asserting that courts
are less suited to develop standards for reasonable accommodation than for tort law); cf. ; Stewart Schwab
& Steven L. Wilborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1197, 1268-71 (2003) (comparing balancing of risks and burdens in negligence determinations to
reasonable accommodation costs and benefits).
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of what constitutes an undue hardship for an employer and that finders of fact will update
that understanding as technology and social attitudes advance.145
3. A Preference, Not Neutrality, and Not Forbidden “Affirmative Action.” The
ADA’s challenge to neutral workplace rules is clear. Accommodations include variances
from leave policies, scheduling policies, job assignment policies, training practices, shift
arrangements, and practices regarding assignment of aides and helpers. All of those are
neutral workplace rules. The fact that work policies and practices are also subject to
attack under an adverse-impact test reinforces the conclusion that neutral rules are not
sacrosanct.146 The reasonable accommodation duty thus constitutes a special preference
to be given to workers who have disabilities that does not apply to others. But it is hardly
an unfair preference. It removes the barriers that currently exist to the full participation
of people with disabilities in employment.
By the time of passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court had cleared up whatever
confusion it caused by using the term “affirmative action” in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis.147 The Court established that the limit of the accommodation duty
under section 504 was fundamental alteration of the relevant program. The ADA’s
legislative history buttresses that understanding by ignoring Davis and eschewing any use
of affirmative action language.148
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Juries came into ADA proceedings not in the original law, but in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(2), (c) (West 2010).
146
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(6) (West 2010).
147
442 U.S. 397 (1979).
148
See supra text accompanying notes 75-82 (discussing Davis).
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II. HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
Both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have had the opportunity to
interpret reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Their interpretations, however,
have not been completely faithful to Congress’s intentions.
A.

THE LOWER COURTS
There are two leading courts of appeals cases on reasonable accommodation and

undue hardship. Other lower court cases may be analyzed by looking at those rejecting
accommodation claims, and those permitting the claims to go to trial.
1. Two Leading Cases. The most prominent court of appeals cases concerning
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
Department of Administration149 and Borkowski v. Valley Central School District.150
Vande Zande involved a state employee with paraplegia.151 She used a
wheelchair for mobility and thus was vulnerable to pressure ulcers, a condition that
periodically required her to stay home for several weeks to permit the sores to heal.152
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44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.). Perhaps because they are written by two prominent former
law professors associated with different wings of the law and economics movement, the cases are
remarkably good tools for demonstrating differing approaches to reasonable accommodation. Accordingly,
they feature as major cases in past editions of a leading disability law casebook, RUTH COLKER, THE LAW
OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 161 (Vande Zande), 169 (Borkowski) (6th ed. 2007). The seventh edition
(2009) drops Borkowski while retaining Vande Zande, despite Borkowski’s validation in US Airways v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002) (citing Borkowski with approval) and the rejection of Vande Zande’s
approach in that case. See infra text accompanying notes 194-226 (discussing Barnett’s interpretation of
reasonable accommodation). Professor Stein makes extensive use of the pair in his article on the economic
analysis of accommodation requirements. Stein, supra note 70, at 97-103. Other sources also juxtapose
the cases. See, e.g., MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW 65-69 (2007); Emens, supra note
65, at 869-74.
151
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544.
152
Id. at 543-44.
150
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Although the employer made some accommodations,153 it refused to provide her a
computer so she could work at home when she was experiencing pressure ulcers and to
lower the sink in the office kitchenette, so that she could use it when at work rather than
having to use the sink in the women’s room.154 In discussing the accommodation duty,
the court declared that the term “reasonable” in “reasonable accommodation” requires a
cost-benefit analysis, by which “at the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to
the benefit.”155 Applying these ideas, the court ruled that reasonable jury could not call
working from home a reasonable accommodation except in “a very extraordinary
case,”156 and that allowing the plaintiff to work at home subject only to a slight loss of
sick leave that might never be needed was “reasonable as a matter of law.”157 Even
though lowering the sink would cost only about $150,158 the court said that step was as a
matter of law not a reasonable accommodation given that the plaintiff could use the sink
in the bathroom.159 The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment without ever
reaching the issue of undue hardship.160
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The court lists these as modifications to the bathrooms and addition of a ramp over a step, some
adjustable furniture, paying for half the cost of a cot needed for personal care, schedule adjustments to
permit medical appointments, and changes to plans for a locker room in a new building. Id. at 544.
154
Id. In the alternative Vande Zande asked that she not be required to use 16.5 hours of sick leave, time
she could not work because she lacked home computer equipment. Id.
155
Id. The court said that the employee must show that an accommodation is reasonable in both the sense
of it being effective and of being proportional to the costs, and that the employer may then respond by
proving that “on more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the
accommodation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.” Id. at 543.
156
The court asserted that most jobs in organizations cannot be performed alone and without supervision
without a substantial loss of productivity, although that “will no doubt change as communication
technology advances.” Id. at 544.
157
Id. at 545.
158
The $150 amount was for moving the sink on the floor on which plaintiff worked, but even moving all
the sinks in the building’s kitchenettes would have cost less than $2,000, and would have benefited others
as well. See id. at 546.
159
The opinion stated: “[W]e do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts of
money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled
workers.” The argument that being forced to use the bathroom rather than the kitchen was stigmatizing
was rejected on the assertion that stigma “is just an epithet.” Id. As Professor Sunstein points out, the
court did not even employ a meaningful cost-benefit analysis in rejecting the accommodation. See
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Borkowski was an elementary school library class teacher who had sustained
neurological injuries in an auto accident fifteen years before becoming employed by the
school district.161 The trauma caused her difficulties with memory and concentration, and
diminished her balance, coordination, and mobility.162 She was denied tenure and
resigned after the principal visited her class and found poor classroom management,
criticizing her for remaining seated during the library class lesson and reporting that
students made noise without being corrected.163
Apparently Borkowski recognized the practice of courts to treat reasonable
accommodation as separate from undue hardship, for she divided the two concepts and
argued that the employee’s burden on the accommodation issue had to be slight in order
to give effect to the congressional intention that defendants bear the burden of proof on
undue hardship.164 Placing stringent requirements on the plaintiff at the reasonable
accommodation stage, as Vande Zande did, would effectively shift the burden to plaintiff
on the question of the difficulty of providing the accommodation even though the statute
says that the defendant bears the burden on undue hardship.165 The Borkowski court
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the school district, reasoning
that an employee bears only a burden of production on whether an accommodation is
reasonable, and declaring that although the question involves a cost-benefits

Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1902 (“Surely it was an inconvenience to Vande Zande, at best, to have to go to
the bathroom when she wanted to use the kitchenette. Surely it was unpleasant, and possibly much worse,
to be excluded in this way. . . . Why was the loss to Vande Zande worth less than $150 . . . ?”).
160
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 546.
161
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 138.
165
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(3) (West 2010) (outlawing “not making reasonable accommodations . . .
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity.”).
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determination, the burden is light: “It is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence
of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its
benefits.”166 Then the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the defendant, and the burden of
persuasion on reasonable accommodation “merges” with the defendant’s “burden of
showing, as an affirmative defense, that the proposed accommodation would cause it to
suffer an undue hardship.”167 Although the court thus split reasonable accommodation
from undue hardship and made them separate burdens, it acknowledged that “in practice,
meeting the burden of nonpersuasion on the reasonableness of the accommodation and
demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship amounts to the same
thing.”168
3. Cases Restricting Accommodation. Many federal court decisions limit the
accommodation duty, for example by restricting the applicability of the accommodation
of reassigning to a vacant position a qualified employee who can no longer do his or her
current job because of disability. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. held that Wal-Mart did
not need to offer a grocery order filler who was injured on the job and could no longer do
her required duties a new position as a router, which was a vacant job she could perform
despite her incapacitated right arm and hand.169 Wal-Mart instead could hire an applicant
with higher qualifications.170 The court declared that “Huber was treated exactly as all
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Id. at 138.
Id.
168
Id. The concurrence noted that more than one court had interpreted the Rehabilitation Act in that
manner. See id. at 145 (Newman, J. concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (discussing
precedent under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). The court found that an issue of fact existed whether
the provision of a teacher’s aide to help maintain order in the class would be a reasonable accommodation.
Id. at 141-43.
169
486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008).
170
The parties stipulated that the individual who received the job was the most qualified candidate,
although the opinion gives no indication what qualifications made the candidate superior to Huber. See id.
at 481.
167
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other candidates were treated for the Wal-Mart job opening, no worse and no better.”171
The court never identified any hardship imposed on Wal-Mart, much less an undue one.
In a similar case, EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Judge Posner rejected the idea of giving
preference to qualified, but in the opinion of the employer, “inferior” applicants who
have disabilities and are transferring from jobs they can no longer perform, calling it
“affirmative action with a vengeance,” a form of preference not required by the statute.172
Not every court has followed this approach. The District of Columbia Circuit in
Aka v. Washington Hospital Center pointed out that a preference is required for the
employee who can no longer do the current job and wants to transfer to a vacant position:
[T]he word “reassign” must mean more than allowing an employee to
apply for a job on the same basis as anyone else. An employee who on his
own initiative applies for and obtains a job elsewhere in the enterprise
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Id. at 484.
227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000). Other cases restrict the availability of reassignment
accommodations. E.g., King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting transfer on ground
plaintiff was not most qualified applicant); Bellino v. Peters, 530 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
offer of transfer to lower paid position was reasonable accommodation as matter of law); Filar v. Bd. of
Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1067-68 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to require employer to reassign employee to single
work location when others in job category had roving locations); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247,
258 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding failure to reassign on ground that employee failed to complete request for
transfer form for each job employee might have obtained); Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619,
623 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment against employee on ground that transfer to lowerpaying position constituted reasonable accommodation even though employee argued that equal-paying
positions for which he held qualifications were available); Schmidt v. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc.,
89 F.3d 342, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against employee who wished to
transfer to other position while still in probationary period contrary to employer policy, when employer
offered choice of additional training in existing job or resignation and reapplication for other job); Hankins
v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against employee who
requested transfer away from noisy environment that exacerbated migraine headaches when employer
offered leave time instead); Micari v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282-83 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (denying that employer may have obligation to transfer employee with disability to another position);
Parisi v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 995 F. Supp. 298, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same).
172
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would not be described as having been “reassigned”; the core word
“assign” implies some active effort on the part of the employer.173
Various other courts follow Aka’s approach.174
Additional decisions reject requests for the accommodation of job restructuring
when the effect is to assign the worker permanently to light duty or to create a new
position for the employee, even when the employer makes no showing of undue
hardship.175 Still other cases reject accommodation requests that relate to getting to

173

156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Discussing the legislative history of the provision, the
court stated:
Had Congress intended that disabled employees be treated exactly like other job
applicants, there would have been no need for the report to go on to explain that “
‘bumping’ another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required,” and
that “if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a
given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job,” id.; there would have been no danger that an employee would be “bumped,” or
that a job would go to a disabled employee with less seniority.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.303, 345).
174
See id. (“Numerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means something more than
treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant.”) (collecting cases); Smith v. Midland Brake, 180
F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[I]f the reassignment language merely requires employers
to consider on an equal basis with all other applicants an otherwise qualified existing employee with a
disability for reassignment to a vacant position, that language would add nothing to the obligation not to
discriminate, and would thereby be redundant . . . .”). For an illuminating discussion of these cases, see
Anderson, supra note 36, at 9-11 (emphasizing distinction between ADA’s reasonable accommodation
obligation and title VII’s equal treatment orientation). Additional decisions articulate robust views of the
duty to reassign. E.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 372-74 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury
verdict in favor of employee with severe depression and insomnia who requested transfer to day shift
position); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[T]he
law is clear that an offer of an inferior position does not constitute a reasonable accommodation where a
position with salary and benefits comparable to those of the employee's former job is available.”); cf.
Vollmert v. Wisc. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 298-302 (7th Cir. 1999) (overturning summary judgment
for employer on ground that additional training for dyslexic employee could constitute reasonable
accommodation and that offer of transfer to position without same opportunities for advancement did not
discharge duty to accommodate employee); Davroll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding
claims of police officers seeking transfers to non-police city positions, contrary to city policy).
175
Watson v. Lithonia Lighting, 304 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding employer’s failure to provide
permanent light-duty position); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding refusal
to assign light-duty posts to employees with long-term impairments), overruled in part on other grounds,
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d
685, 689 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding policy of forbidding employee with permanent restrictions from
remaining in light-duty positions); Allen v. Georgia Power Co., 980 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(holding that assignment to permanent light duty position was not reasonable accommodation); Champ v.
Baltimore County, 884 F. Supp. 991, 999-1000 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that police officer need not be
assigned to permanent light-duty position); McDonald v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrections, 880 F. Supp. 1416 (D.
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work, such as shift changes due to transportation problems, distinguishing these proposed
rules modifications from accommodations that relate to what happens inside the
workplace.176 Courts have refused to require employers to permit employees to work
from home,177 even though this would be a reasonable accommodation for many jobs and
perhaps the most logical response to the difficulties people with disabilities have in using
existing transportation options.178 A court refused to send to the jury a case in which an
employee with a mental impairment requested a transfer away from supervisors who
imposed undue stress, deeming it not a reasonable accommodation and an undue hardship

Kan. 1995); see Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding refusal to move
correctional officer to position without inmate contact when employer had practice of rotating officers
through various positions); Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729-30 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that employee’s proposed accommodation of permanent position in position that otherwise
rotated among employees was not reasonable); England v. ENBI Indiana, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding refusal to permit press operator to avoid use of one press and modify use of
other, when employer had policy of rotating workers among different presses); see also Fedro v. Reno, 21
F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding refusal to combine two part-time positions into full-time position in
Rehabilitation Act case); Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 50 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (same in ADA
case); cf. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (asserting that
plaintiff lacked qualifications for vacant secretarial positions).
176
See Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L.J. 1, 37 (2004) (citing Wade v. General Motors
Corp., No. 97-3378, 1998 WL 639162, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998)). Wade, it may be noted, appears to
rely more on the idea that difficulty in getting to work during darkness because of a vision problem does
not constitute a substantial limit on the major life activity of working. It is also true, as Bagenstos points
out, that some courts have been open to the possibility of requiring accommodations that facilitate getting
to work. See Bagenstos, supra, at 37. Other courts, however, have not. See, e.g., Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526
F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that school district need not assign teacher to single school within
walking distance of public transportation as accommodation for teacher’s arthritis condition); Earl v.
Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000) (rejecting accommodation of flexible schedule for worker
with obsessive-compulsive disorder, reasoning that punctuality constituted essential function of job).
Professor Basas concludes, “[C]ases involving a]ccommodations related to getting to work . . . demonstrate
the sprit by which ‘reasonableness’ has been applied thus far: as an imprecise, bias-laden, pro-employer
conduit for attitudinal barriers and misconceptions about disability.” Basas, supra note 95, at 64.
177
See, e.g., Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(applying Rehabilitation Act); see also Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[W]e note that as a general matter, working at home is not a reasonable accommodation.”). But see
Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (overturning undue hardship
ruling in Rehabilitation Act case involving working from home).
178
See Basas, supra note 95, at 86 (“Hurdles to arriving at work are magnified for persons with disabilities.
Requests to work at home are often prompted by the difficulty of appearing at work, whether because the
commute is particularly taxing, or because public transportation is inaccessible or unreliable.”). Basas
notes that working at home can be an attractive accommodation for other reasons as well: “Often the
workplace is not a hospitable environment for building in breaks, taking medicine, or situating one’s body
comfortably.” Id.
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per se.179 Another held that assigning a long-term job coach is not a reasonable
accommodation.180 A court rejected as a matter of law a request for a part-time work
schedule,181 even though part-time and modified schedules are an accommodation listed
in the ADA itself.182 A court has held that hiring a “helper” to do some aspects of a job is
not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law,183 despite the examples cited in the
ADA legislative history of readers being required to be hired for blind public aid
caseworkers and aides for blind teachers.184
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Wiggins v. DaVita Tidewater, LLC, 451 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also Weiler v.
Household Fin. Corp., 101 F. 3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In essence, Weiler asks us to allow her to
establish the conditions of her employment, most notably, who will supervise her. Nothing in the ADA
allows this shift in responsibility.”); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that essential functions of job included working under assigned supervisor, and “[n]othing in the
law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability acts, Congress intended to interfere with personnel
decisions within an organizational hierarchy.”); Kolpas v. G.D. Searle & Co., 959 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (“It is not a reasonable accommodation for an employer to have to transfer an employee to a
position under another supervisor.”). But see Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 122-23 (2d Cir.
1999) (“[T]he question of whether a requested accommodation is a reasonable one must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. . . . A per se rule stating that the replacement of a supervisor can never be a reasonable
accommodation is therefore inconsistent with our ADA case law. There is a presumption, however, that a
request to change supervisors is unreasonable . . . .”).
180
Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 809, 822-23 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (semble), aff’d,
485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007)
181
Treanor v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he ADA does not
require an employer to create a new part-time position where none previously existed.”); Terrell v. USAir,
132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In a specific situation, part-time employment may or may not be
reasonable. In this case, where USAir had no part-time jobs when Plaintiff demanded such a position, a
request for part-time employment was unreasonable.”); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379
(E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that allowing part-time employment would, inter alia, “alter the employment
pattern universally imposed within the company”), aff’d, 33 Fed. App’x 49 (4th Cir. 2002).
182
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(B) (West 2010).
183
Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Kan. 1995) (“As to plaintiff's final contention, the
court does not believe that requiring Xerox to hire a ‘helper’ to assist him in performing the essential
functions of any position would, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation.”) (footnote omitted),
aff’d, 96 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1996) (table); see also Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 295-96
(5th Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer on neurologist’s claim that employer
had to hire administrative assistant for him as reasonable accommodation).
184
See Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984); see
also supra text accompanying notes 47, 69 (discussing legislative history). More than one court has
approved the refusal of an employer bound by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to provide someone who
can read to an employee unable to do so, despite the congressional approval of Nelson. Johnson v. Ga.
Dep’t of Human Res., 983 F. Supp. 1464, 1472-73 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (food stamp caseworker in ADA case);
DiPompo v. West Point Military Acad., 770 F. Supp. 887, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (firefighter in
Rehabilitation Act case).
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4. Cases Upholding Accommodations Claims. Nonetheless, a number of courts
view the accommodation obligation expansively and impose significant obligations to
accommodate. A court overturned a grant of summary judgment to an employer when
the employer denied an employee with epilepsy who could not drive an accommodation
to allow her to make bank deposits of store receipts without driving there herself.185
Another reversed summary judgment when an employer failed to afford the requested
accommodation of specialized training to an employee with learning disabilities who had
trouble mastering a new computer system.186 Still another held that summary judgment
was improper when a mechanic who could no longer make repetitive motions with his
left arm and shoulder contended that he could perform the essential functions of a the job
if it were restructured or that he could be assigned a position that may have been open for
a recycling foreman.187 Yet another overturned summary judgment when a production
inspector worker with a back impairment who could not work on more than one assembly
line was denied an exemption from a rotation system.188 And a court of appeals ruled
that summary judgment should not have been granted an employer when an employee
who used a wheelchair and experienced problems clocking in on time requested as an
accommodation a variance from a strict punctuality policy.189 District courts have denied
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Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiff suggested
several ‘plausible accommodation[s]’ to enable her to be promoted at S-44, including having the manager
of a nearby store drive her or hiring a car service or a driver at her own expense. The proposed
accommodations are not, facially, an ‘undue hardship’ . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
186
Vollmert v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 302 (7th Cir. 1999).
187
Benson v. Nw. Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-15 (8th Cir. 1995).
188
Turner v. Hershey Chocolate, 440 F.3d 604, 615 (3d Cir. 2006). The rotation system was adopted to
decrease the risk of repetitive motion injuries, id. at 607, but the finder of fact could find that limiting the
plaintiff’s participation would not interfere with rotations of other workers, id. at 614.
189
Holly v. Clairson Indus., 492 F.3d 1247, 1261 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he most that can be said for
Clairson's position is that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether punctuality as defined
by Clairson's policy is an essential element of Holly's job, and it was thus error for the district court to have
taken this issue away from the fact-finder and awarded summary judgment to Clairson.”). The problems
stemmed from, among other things, the time clock being blocked by furniture and the path to the clock

49

employers’ motions for summary judgment with regard to requested accommodations
that included extension of leave of absence beyond one year,190 moving an employee with
mental illness to a day shift,191 providing a parent aide or other measures to enable a
teacher with impaired speech to keep order in the classroom,192 and, though contrary to
the majority position, long-term light duty work.193
B.

THE SUPREME COURT
The only Supreme Court decision on reasonable accommodations under title I of

the ADA is US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.194 The case involved a cargo handler who
injured his back and transferred under the company’s voluntary (not collectively
bargained) seniority system to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom.195
He held that position for two years, but the job then became open to seniority-based
bidding, and employees with greater seniority wanted it.196 Barnett asked as an
accommodation for his disability that he be allowed to keep the position, making an
exception to the ordinary operation of the seniority system.197 After five months of
deliberation, US Airways said no, Barnett lost his job, and he sued under title I of the

being slow to negotiate in a wheelchair because of various obstacles. Id. at 1249-51. Waiver of start-time
policies may be required in other contexts as well. See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that in job that permitted starting times between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. that issue of
fact existed whether plaintiff’s proposal that employer permit later start time constituted reasonable
accommodation).
190
Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enter., 231 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also Velente-Hook v. E.
Plumas Health Care, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that employer was obliged to
consider personal leave beyond set medical absence period while employee underwent chemotherapy).
191
Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (D.P.R. 1999).
192
Olian v. Bd. of Educ.,631 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
193
Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that transfer to
light duty position may be reasonable accommodation).
194
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
195
Id. at 394.
196
Id.
197
Id.
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ADA.198 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, relying on the
proposition that any exception to seniority would pose undue hardship.199 The Ninth
Circuit reversed en banc, ruling that the seniority system should be only one factor in the
undue hardship determination.200 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.201
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion first rejected US Airways’ argument that
because the ADA merely equalizes treatment of persons with disabilities, a disabilityneutral rule such as job assignment under a seniority system should always prevail over a
claim for accommodation.202 The Court declared that the ADA requires preferences for
people with disabilities in the form of accommodations in order to afford those who have
disabling conditions with the same workplace opportunities as others: “[P]references will
sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal. The Act
requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’ that are needed for
those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without
disabilities automatically enjoy.”203 Exceptions from neutral rules are prime examples of
mandatory accommodations, such as job restructuring, modified work schedules, and
provision of specialized equipment.204
The Court then rejected Barnett’s view that reasonable accommodation means
effective accommodation and that since the transfer was obviously an effective
accommodation, the Court could move on to the undue hardship analysis.205 While not

198

Id.
Id. at 395.
200
Barnett v. US Airways, 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
201
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406.
202
Id. at 397.
203
Id.; see also id. (“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee
with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially.”).
204
See id. at 398 (discussing accommodations that entail departure from neutral rules).
205
Id. at 400.
199
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advancing the argument that reasonable accommodation are two ends of a continuum or
two sides of the same coin, Barnett had argued that placing any greater obligation on the
plaintiff at the summary judgment phase than showing that the accommodation is
reasonable in the sense of being effective would undermine the congressional intention of
having the employer bear the burden of showing that the accommodation imposes undue
hardship.206 The Court took note of the “practical burden of proof dilemma,” but said
that “reasonable” does not mean “effective” in ordinary language, and that it should be a
term separate and apart from undue hardship.207 The Court also noted that undue
hardship is, under the statute, undue hardship on the operation of the business; according
to the Court an accommodation could be unreasonable on grounds other than effects on
the operation of the business, for example, because of its effect on co-workers.208 The
Court said that neither the statute or any other congressional source indicated that
reasonable means no more than effective.209
Nevertheless, the majority opinion endorsed the approach taken by Judge
Calabresi in Borkowski that the way to give reasonable accommodation a separate
meaning but not undermine the congressional assignment of the burden on undue
hardship to the employer is to ask at summary judgment only whether the
accommodation seems reasonable on its face, that is, ordinarily or in the run of cases.210
Once the plaintiff has shown the accommodation is reasonable on its face or in the run of
cases, the defendant must then show “special (typically case-specific) circumstances that
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Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 400.
208
Id. at 400-01.
209
Id. at 401.
210
Id. at 401-02.
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demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”211 Thus the Court gave an
independent meaning to reasonable accommodation, but one that made it an easy hurdle
to surmount, and the Court made undue hardship the topic that would require careful,
case-specific analysis.
Applying this approach, the Court perhaps put somewhat sharper teeth into the
reasonable accommodation requirement in seniority cases than others by saying that
ordinarily an accommodation that violates a seniority system would not be reasonable,
given the judicial deference to seniority systems in other contexts and the benefits to
employees of consistent, uniformly administered seniority systems.212 Nevertheless, an
employee remains free to show that an exception to seniority is reasonable on the facts of
the case. The employee might show, for example, that frequent departures from the
system have reduced employee expectations of consistent application, or that there are
enough exceptions to the system’s operation that one more will not matter.213 The case
needed to be remanded for such a showing.214
One may fault the Court for failing to recognize that reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship are two sides of the same coin, but its reading of reasonable
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Id. at 402.
Id. at 403-05.
213
Id. at 405.
214
Id. at 406. Two justices concurred. Justice Stevens joined the opinion but emphasized the many factual
questions that remained open for determination on remand. Id. at 407-08 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
O’Connor joined the opinion in order to create a majority interpretation of the statute, though she
expressed reservations about the Court’s test for ascertaining whether an job assignment that violates a
seniority system is a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She said she
preferred a test under which the effect of the seniority system on the reasonableness of a reassignment
accommodation would depend on whether the seniority system is legally enforceable. Id. She noted,
however, that the Court’s approach would often cause the same outcome. Id. at 411 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Souter,
whose opinion was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 420 (Souter, J., concurring).
212
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accommodation as an easy burden to surmount, 215 apparently in all cases but those
involving seniority,216 may practically be not too far from the mark.217 The Court
followed congressional instructions by placing the emphasis on the undue hardship test,
where the employer has the burden, but the Court did not have any occasion to discuss
what level of hardship must occur before it becomes undue. The Court did not impose a
cost-benefit analysis on reasonable accommodations, and in all but seniority system cases
it gave respect to the trier of fact by holding that even a weak showing on
reasonableness—reasonable on its face or in the run of cases—will get the claimant past a
motion for summary judgment. It would be more consistent with the correct
interpretation of the statute, however, to approach the reasonable-in-the-run-of-cases test

215

Professor Anderson is more critical on this count, though she notes that “the Court adopts what might
appear to be a plaintiff-friendly standard of facial feasibility or plausibility.” Anderson, supra note 36, at
28.
216
To afford this exalted protection to seniority, the Court had to ignore language in the ADA’s legislative
history that, though it dealt directly with collectively bargained seniority, would appear to apply with
greater force to a voluntary seniority system: “For example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves
certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining
whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to the
job. However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. Justice Souter’s dissent relied heavily on this and similar
legislative history, which strongly supports the Ninth Circuit’s position that seniority provisions, even those
in a legally enforceable collective bargaining agreement, are simply a factor in connection with the
reasonability of the reassignment accommodation. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting). As
Souter pointed out, statements in the ADA’s legislative history do not overrule legally enforceable labor
contract provisions, but they surely demonstrate that Congress did not want to give greater weight than
only-a-factor for seniority systems that are not even in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 422.
Professor Befort believes that reassignment of an employee with a disability is an accommodation that
“requires a greater degree of workplace reorganization and imposes extra burdens on both employers and
fellow workers as compared to other types of accommodations.” Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable
Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and
Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931 (2003). Perhaps these
considerations account for some of the resistance to the congressional command concerning reassignment.
217
Illustrating this point, even post-Barnett cases that overturn summary judgments against employees
frequently jump from stating the reasonable accommodation duty to analyzing undue hardship. See, e.g.,
Ekstrad v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no undue hardship in
providing teacher with seasonal affective disorder for classroom with natural light).
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as a search for obvious examples of undue hardship, rather than an independent inquiry
into reasonableness.218
The Court’s decision firmly rejected the position taken in Justice Scalia’s dissent
that the ADA’s accommodation duty requires only “the suspension (within reason) of
those employment rules and practices that the employee’s disability prevents him from
observing.”219 Scalia said it was a mistake to interpret the ADA, as the Court did, to
“make all employment rules and practices—even those which (like a seniority system)
pose no distinctive obstacle to the disabled—subject to suspension when that is (in a
court’s view) a reasonable means of enabling a disabled employee to keep his job.”220
For Scalia, no exemption should be required with regard to neutral rules that “bear no
more heavily upon the disabled employee than upon others,” such as “a seniority system,
which burdens the disabled and nondisabled alike.”221 According to Scalia, “When one
departs from this understanding, the ADA’s accommodation provision becomes a
standardless grab bag-leaving it to the courts to decide which workplace preferences
(higher salary, longer vacations, reassignment to positions to which others are entitled)
can be deemed “reasonable” to ‘make up for’ the particular employee’s disability.”222
Justice Scalia relied heavily223 on EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling224 and similar opinions,
such as the dissent in Aka.225
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My thanks to Professor Cheryl Anderson for this idea.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
Id.
221
Id. at 413.
222
Id. at 414-15.
223
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224
227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussed supra text accompanying note 172).
225
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 13114-15 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (discussed supra
text accompanying note 173).
219
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The majority firmly rejected Scalia’s argument, identifying its fundamental error.
There is no valid analytic distinction between a seniority system or other neutral
employment rule that imposes a difficulty on an employee with a disability because the
employee can do no other job and a neutral rule such as an office assignment policy that
imposes a difficulty on an employee with a disability because the employee cannot use a
particular work station.226 There is no such distinction in the statute and no basis to
impose one by judicial fiat.

III. CORRECTING THE COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
The judicial interpretations do not match the observations that this Article has put
forward about the proper interpretation of the accommodation duty in light of evidence of
congressional intentions. Nevertheless, there is ample authority to rely on in correcting
the interpretation of the provision. These sources buttress the conclusion that reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are the same concept rather than two separate
hurdles for claimants, that the burden on employers is substantial, and that required
accommodations frequently require departures from neutral employer policies.
A.

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
The statute itself and its legislative history are the best sources on the proposition

that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two ends of the same concept,
two sides of the same coin. This interpretation, however, is also consistent with the
226

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an
employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference in treatment
violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act’s
potential reach.”), 397-98 (“Neutral office assignment rules would automatically prevent the
accommodation of an employee whose disability-imposed limitations require him to work on the ground
floor. . . . Neutral furniture budget rules would automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual
who needs a different kind of chair or desk.”).
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Supreme Court’s interpretation of comparable terms of other titles of the ADA, and with
the interpretations of courts other than the federal judiciary interpreting similar statutes.
1. Looking to the Statute and Its History. Despite what the courts said in Vande
Zande and even Borkowski and Barnett, the reality is that the statute makes the
accommodations term a single concept and a single test: accommodation up to the limit
of hardship. It may, of course, be argued that failure of Congress to overrule Barnett
through new legislation constitutes a ratification of Barnett’s interpretation. The
Supreme Court frequently disregards such arguments,227 though at times it relies on
them.228 Even if the arguments might be persuasive in some cases, they are not so with
regard to the meaning of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in title I of the
ADA. The Supreme Court’s sole case dealing with those terms is bounded by the
unique—perhaps peculiar—desire to insulate seniority systems from attack and is widely
known only with regard to its holdings about reassignment under seniority systems.229
As noted below, it is at odds with the Court’s interpretation of comparable terms in titles
II and III of the same statute.230 The ADA has not been reenacted in the years following
Barnett, and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 embraced only a limited set of the most
urgent corrections to judicial interpretations of the law, hardly constituting a
comprehensive fix for the statute’s potential problems of judicial interpretation.231
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See, e.g., Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (overruling previous
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on rereading of relevant legislative history of statute passed in
1871).
228
See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989), superseded by statute in part not
relevant, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
229
This fact is well demonstrated by the reassignment-specific nature of the academic commentary. See,
e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 88, 216 (articles discussing Barnett).
230
See infra text accompanying notes 238-50 (title III), 251-260 (title II), 261-64 (both).
231
See Long, supra note 8 (noting that ADAAA focuses on definition of disability, reacting to judicial
interpretations on that topic); see also Travis, supra note 10, at 320 (“[T]he ADAAA was driven by a
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Moreover, as emphasized above, it is only after more cases start to make it past the
coverage phase of litigation that problems with judicial interpretation of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are likely to become apparent.232 The need for a
congressional fix is not yet obvious.
Even if Barnett is unlikely to be overruled or disapproved in the near future, it
should be read extremely narrowly as to the burden placed on claimants to show
reasonableness of an accommodation: simply that there is no obvious undue hardship
caused by the accommodation. This is hardly unrealistic. Barnett’s language suggests
that in all but seniority system cases the claimant’s burden should be light.233 Courts
should be encouraged to think of the reasonableness step as unnecessary altogether. As
Professors Karlan and Rutherglen declared half a decade before Barnett, “Although . . . it
would technically be possible for an accommodation both to be reasonable and to be
unduly burdensome, as a practical matter the two concepts operate in tandem.” 234 They
noted that “courts that find a particular accommodation to be ‘reasonable’ are unlikely to
exempt employers from undertaking it, and courts that find a particular accommodation
to impose an ‘undue hardship’ are correspondingly unlikely to demand that an employer
shoulder it.”235
2. Looking to Interpretations of Analogous Terms in the ADA. The decisions
with respect to reasonable accommodation in employment—even Barnett, which is more
“accommodating” than those of many lower courts—are out of sync with those in other
coalition of disability rights activists, shepherded through Congress by a few personally interested
members, and received little media attention . . . .”).
232
See supra text accompanying notes 8, 10.
233
See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401-02 (discussing with approval lower courts’ holdings that “a
plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer's motion for summary judgment) need only show that
an “accommodation” seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.”).
234
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 11.
235
Id.
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areas. Title III of the ADA applies to places of public accommodation, such as stores,
restaurants, movie theaters, and offices open to the public.236 The language of what it
requires of those who operate those places is not precisely the same as that of title I, but it
is closely comparable. Title III requires providers of public accommodations to make
reasonable modifications in their policies (the analogue of reasonable accommodation)
unless the provider can show the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the public accommodation (the analogue of undue hardship).237
The key Supreme Court case on reasonable modification in places of public
accommodation is Martin v. PGA Tour,238 a well-known decision involving professional
golfer Casey Martin, whose degenerative leg disease prevented him from playing without
the use of a golf cart. Professional golfers normally enter the PGA tour circuit by
submitting letters of recommendation and paying a fee to compete in a qualifying
tournament called the Q-School. Golf carts are permitted during the first two rounds of
the Q-School, but all competitors must walk in the final one, and the PGA refused
Martin’s request that he be provided the accommodation of a waiver of the no-carts rule.
Martin sued under title III of the ADA.
The Supreme Court upheld an injunction that Martin be permitted to use a cart.
After determining that the tour was in fact a public accommodation,239 the Court held that
waiving the requirement that golfers walk the course is not a modification of practices
that would fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA tournaments. Justice Stevens wrote
236

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189 (West 2010).
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local
Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1118-32 (comparing duties under various ADA titles
and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
238
532 U.S. 661 (2001).
239
Id. at 677.
237
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in the majority opinion that the waiver was a reasonable modification, stating that the
PGA admitted that using a cart was necessary for Martin to play without suffering
incapacitating injury.240 “Martin’s claim thus differs from one that might be asserted by
players with less serious afflictions that make walking the course uncomfortable or
difficult, but not beyond their capacity.”241 In that instance, “an accommodation might be
reasonable but not necessary.”242 In this instance, however, “the narrow dispute” was
whether waiver of the walking rule would fundamentally alter the nature of the
tournament.243 The Court thus treated reasonable modification and fundamental
alteration as one term, two sides of the same coin.
On the question whether use of a cart rather than walking constitutes a
fundamental alteration of the nature of the enterprise, Justice Stevens reasoned in his
majority opinion that modifications of rules might be fundamental alterations if they (1)
altered an essential aspect of the game, such as the diameter of the hole, so that the
modification would be unacceptable even if all players were affected equally, or (2) made
a less significant change with a minor impact, but one that would give the recipient of the
modification a competitive advantage.244 Number one did not apply, because the essence
of golf is making shots, rather than walking, even when golf is played at the highest
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Id. at 682 (“Petitioner does not contest that a golf cart is a reasonable modification that is necessary if
Martin is to play in its tournaments.”).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. Justice Stevens explained in a footnote that the law entailed three questions: if the requested
modification is reasonable, if it is necessary for the person with a disability, and whether it constitutes a
fundamental alteration. In logic, said the Court, there is no necessary order in which the questions must be
answered, and “In routine cases, the fundamental alteration inquiry may end with the question whether a
rule is essential.” Id. at 683 n.38. Therefore, some cases might entail an investigation whether a
modification is reasonable that is in some respect divorced from the fundamental alteration inquiry, but as
soon as the modification is shown to be necessary for the plaintiff to obtain a benefit from the public
accommodation, the inquiry is satisfied and the case moves on to consider fundamental alteration.
244
Id. at 682-83.
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levels.245 The Court deemed any effect on outcome to be insignificant given that
competitors never play under precisely identical conditions and the effects of fatigue
from walking a golf course are usually minimal.246 Martin himself suffered far greater
fatigue from walking to and from the cart than golfers without disabilities who walk the
whole course.247 Justice Scalia, writing in dissent for himself and Justice Thomas, argued
that the rules of all games are arbitrary and thus it makes no sense to deem one or another
rule inessential.248 Moreover, the waiver of any rule could have an effect on outcome,
particularly given that golf is primarily a game of skill.249
The Court in Martin not only treated the reasonable modification duty
(comparable to reasonable accommodation) and the fundamental alteration limit
(comparable to undue hardship) as a single term, it also displayed a high level of
skepticism about the value of standard operating procedure and uniform treatment of all
persons subject to a set of rules. It opened itself to criticism for dictating what is essential
to someone else’s activity and what is not, which is very much what the statute requires a
court to do, but what courts have proven themselves generally unwilling to do in
employment cases under title I of the ADA.250
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Id. at 683-86. The Court consulted the widely accepted Rules of Golf written by the United States Golf
Association and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of Scotland (as opposed to the specific rules adopted for
the third round of the Q-School and most of its other tournaments by the PGA) and looked to the history of
the game and the more recent history of the use of carts. Id at 683-85.
246
Id. at 686-88.
247
Id. at 690.
248
Id. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Scalia, whether walking is a fundamental aspect of golf is an
“incredibly difficult and incredibly silly” question that “[e]ither out of humility or out of self-respect (one
or the other) the Court should decline to answer.” Id. at 700.
249
Id. at 701. Moreover, Scalia noted, the modification of the rule potentially favored only one player. Id.
The other Supreme Court case on reasonable accommodation under title III, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998), also provoked a stinging dissent from Justice Scalia, but that case dealt primarily with whether
a person with asymptomatic HIV infection was covered under the ADA, rather than what accommodations
she should receive.
250
It is true, as Professor Waterstone points out, that the accommodation in Martin did not cost money.
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV.
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Non-employment related precedent under title II of the ADA251 also reveals a
liberal approach to that title’s analogues to reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship, as well as the treatment of the concepts as two sides of the same coin.
Regulations promulgated to enforce title II require “reasonable modifications” in
programs and activities conducted by state and local governments, and afford the
governmental entities a defense if the modifications constitute “fundamental alterations”
of services and programs.252 In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court considered the case
of two women with mental disabilities who had lived for many years in state institutions,
even though treatment professionals believed that they could be served in communitybased residential programs that would afford them more freedom and better opportunity
for participation in community activities.253 The Court affirmed in part and vacated in
part a ruling that the state violated title II of the ADA by failing to place the women in
the community. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion concluded that title II, whose regulations
provide that a “public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities”254 supported the plaintiffs’ claim for a community placement.255 The opinion

1807, 1852-53 (2005). But the fact that the PGA pursued the case to the Supreme Court is only one
indication of how important the PGA felt the rule was to its operation. The PGA also enlisted celebrity
golfers and other witnesses to develop an extensive testimonial record in the case.
251
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134 (West 2010). Title II contains simply a definitions section, a broad
declaration that disability discrimination by state and local government agencies is illegal, a remedies
provision, and a delegation to the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement that
prohibition.
252
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2009) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”).
253
527 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1999).
254
28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998).
255
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597-603
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nevertheless cautioned that the state’s responsibility was “not boundless.”256 Citing the
reasonable modifications-fundamental alterations language, Justice Ginsburg said that
while the state must alter its placement practices, the regulation required consideration of
state resource allocations concerns in light of the need to provide community placement
to the all the people with mental disabilities for whom state was responsible and who
desired it. The opinion pointed out that the state could not necessarily save money by
closing institutions if some residents still needed or wanted institutional settings;
community placements, if scarce, needed to be allocated fairly.257 But the Court did
require a comprehensive, effective working plan to place individuals in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that moved at not less than a reasonable pace,258 a rate not
controlled by any effort to keep the institutions populated.259
The Court thus imposed on the state a significant duty to accommodate persons
with disabilities under the reasonable modification standard. As importantly, the lead
opinion also read “reasonable modifications” and “fundamental alteration” as the same
term.260 It did not ask first whether the expansion of available community placements
was reasonable in the run of cases, and then whether on a more particularized showing, it
would constitute a fundamental alteration under the facts of the case. Instead, the opinion
spoke of “the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications
256

Id. at 603. This part of the opinion had the votes of its author and Justices O’Connor, Souter, and
Breyer. Justice Stevens concurred in the result and joined the rest of the opinion, but said that the issue was
disposed of in earlier proceedings in the case and was not properly before the Court. Id. at 607 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment. Id. at 610-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
257
Id. at 604
258
The Court equated a reasonable pace to “‘asking [a] person to wait a short time until a community be is
available.’” Id. at 606 (quoting oral argument of state’s attorney).
259
Id. at 605.
260
Justice Stevens’s vote would have made the opinion a majority, and it seems clear from his opinion in
Martin that he would have embraced an approach similar to that of Justice Ginsburg on this issue; his
endorsement of the lower court decision, which balanced the cost of accommodating the two plaintiffs
against the entire relevant expenditures of the state, displayed an attitude even more favorably disposed to
the plaintiffs’ position. See supra text accompanying notes 238-50 (discussing Martin opinion).
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regulation,” saying that it allowed “the State to show that, in the allocation of available
resources, immediate relief for plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility
the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of
persons with mental disabilities.”261 The opinion went on to develop the limits on the
community-placement modification that it believed were fundamental alterations, but it
never discussed the pairing of reasonable modification and fundamental alteration as
anything but two aspects of the same idea.
Lower court cases under titles II and III involving issues other than employment
manifest a similar approach to Martin and Olmstead in interpreting the titles’ reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship analogues. In title II cases, courts typically omit or
give only the slightest attention to any reasonable modification determination and instead
leap to considering fundamental alteration, thus taking the reasonable modificationfundamental alteration question as the same inquiry.262 Even some employment cases
concerning the federal agency provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, whose
accommodation language parallels that of the ADA, manifest a two-sides-of-the-samecoin approach.263 The interpretation of titles II and III by the Supreme Court and the
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Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604.
E.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying all
motions for summary judgment in case concerning adequacy of integration of individuals with mental
illness in adult home placements and treating reasonable modification and fundamental alteration as
alternatives, stating “The court will consider all of this evidence together in determining whether the
requested relief would be a ‘reasonable modification’ or ‘fundamental alteration’ of Defendants' programs
and services.”); AP v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1141 & n.13 (D.
Minn. 2008) (denying summary judgment on request for accommodations for child’s diabetes in public day
care program, with limited exception as to damages claim, considering reasonable modification and
fundamental alteration together and giving primary consideration to fundamental alteration defense).
263
See Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1991) (“An unreasonable accommodation is one
which would impose undue hardship on the operation of its program.”) (quoting Arneson v. Heckler, 879
F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation omitted); Meisser v. Hove, 872 F. Supp. 507, 520 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (“Since defendant made some accommodation, the court views the issue of whether that
accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances as analytically inseparable from the issue of
whether additional accommodation could have been made without undue hardship.”); see also cases cited
262
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other courts in a manner that treats makes the concept of accommodation a continuum
from reasonable modification to fundamental alteration, from reasonable accommodation
to undue hardship, should be highly persuasive. Even authorities wedded to textualism
look to interpretations of the same or similar language in other parts of a statute or
comparable statutes in interpreting terms of the statute in question.264 It is entirely apt to
rely on these title II and III decisions in future employment accommodations cases.
3. Looking to Interpretations in Other Jurisdictions. As the precedent regarding
titles II and III indicates, reasonable accommodation and its analogues, and undue
hardship and its analogues, need not be read as separate terms. Notably, Canadian law,
like American law, requires reasonable accommodation265 and establishes an undue
hardship defense,266 but the Canadian Supreme Court has declared that the reasonable
accommodation duty and the undue hardship defense “are not independent criteria but are
alternate ways of expressing the same concept.”267 Viewing the terms as part of the same
concept, two sides of the same coin rather than independent criteria, has an impact on
disability discrimination cases.268 For example, in contrast to the United States Supreme
Court’s treatment of seniority rights as all but untouchable in Barnett, the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal in Regina (City) v. Kivela required as a reasonable accommodation the
award of retroactive competitive seniority credit for a truck driver with cerebral palsy
supra note 55-60 (discussing pre-ADA Rehabilitation Act precedent). Federal agency employees are
covered under section 504 rather than under title I of the ADA.
264
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 348 (2010).
265
Employment Equity Act, 1995 S.C., ch. 44 § 5(b).
266
Id. § 6(a). These provisions are federal; provincial legislation is similar. See, e.g., Human Rights Code
of Manitoba, 1987-88 S.M., ch. 45 § 9(1).
267
Cent. Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 ¶ 26 (Can.) (religious accommodation
case).
268
This point may seem obvious from the discussion of Vande Zande and other cases that throw out
accommodation claims without ever reaching hardship or where the showing of hardship is nonexistent or
weak, see supra text accompanying notes 169-72, 175-83 (discussing cases not reaching undue hardship),
but the contrast with results in jurisdictions that use the two-sides-of-the-coin approach remains instructive.
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whose disability kept him from performing extra manual labor assignments that permitted
other workers to accrue greater credit toward seniority.269 Similarly, a Canadian labor
tribunal required maintenance of full-time benefits for an employee whose disability
permitted only part-time work, emphasizing that no undue hardship was proven. 270
B.

A SIGNIFICANT DUTY, NOT A COST-BENEFITS TEST
The ADA and its history, interpretations of other, analogous terms of the ADA,

and the better-reasoned of the precedent all support the idea that the accommodation duty
is strenuous, not subject to cost-benefits balancing, but subject to an increase of
obligations as technology and expectations advance. Restoring the proper interpretation
of the statute may be done most effectively by encouraging courts to step back and let
juries make accommodations determinations.
1. Looking to the Statute and Its History. Accommodations such as aides for
blind teachers or readers for blind or deaf caseworkers, or personal attendants at work
and travel all cost money, and all might fail a cost-benefits balance. Yet these are
accommodations the legislative history specifies. And their imposition is consistent with
the language of the statute, which rejects only “significant difficulty or expense,” when
considered in light of factors such as the overall financial resources of the employer.271
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[2006] 275 Sask R. 271 (Sask. Ct. App.) (Can.).
Ins. Corp. of B.C. v. OPE.I.U. Local 378, [2003] 123 L.A.C. (4th) 422 ¶ 48 (B.C. Arbitration Bd.)
(Can.); see id. at ¶ 27 (discussing undue hardship); see also O.S.S.T.F., Dist. 10 v. Peel (County) Bd. of
Educ., [1999] 73 L.A.C. (4th) 183 (Ontario Arbitration Bd.) (Can.) (requiring that teacher with multiple
sclerosis working two-thirds of normal school day and applying sick leave for remainder of day receive
income and pension benefits of full-time teacher). In general, Canadian decisions impose a strong
accommodation duty on employers, see Michael Lynk, Disability and Work: The Transformation of the
Legal Status of Employees with Disabilities in Canada, in LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA SPECIAL
LECTURES 2007: EMPLOYMENT LAW 189 (Randall Scott Echlin & Chris Paliare eds. 2008), available at
http://www.irwinlaw.com/books.aspx?bookid=479 (collecting and analyzing Canadian cases on reasonable
accommodation), though accommodations appear to be more plentiful in the unionized sector than in nonunionized employment, see Ravi Malhotra, A Tale of Marginalization: Comparing Workers with
Disabilities in Canada and the United States, 22 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 79, 101-02 (2009) .
271
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(B) (West 2010).
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2. Looking to Interpretations of Analogous Terms in the ADA. Professor
Waterstone has documented that results in cases brought under titles II and III are much
more favorable to claimants than in cases under title I, and he concludes that “courts are
not as troubled by the accommodations mandate in the title II and III contexts.”272
Examination of individual title II opinions confirms the liberality of the courts’ approach
to reasonable modifications as well.273 As noted, the Supreme Court’s decisions on titles
II and III impose significant unwanted burdens on the defendants.
3. Looking to (Selected) Precedent. As noted above, many federal courts,
particularly courts of appeals, have permitted finders of fact to determine that quite
onerous accommodations are required under the reasonable accommodation-undue
hardship test.274 Some state court cases interpreting analogous state law provisions also
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Waterstone, supra note 250, at 1849 (contending that either this is true or courts are finding other ways
to reach pro-plaintiff results and finding reasons to believe former is correct); see also id. at 1828-29 (in
study of title II and III appellate cases available on Westlaw, finding in title II cases that defendants obtain
full reversal in 34% of cases and plaintiffs obtain reversal in 24% of cases and in title III cases that
defendants obtain full reversal in 50% of cases and plaintiffs obtain reversal in 24% of cases, compared
with study of title I appellate cases showing that defendants obtain reversal in 42% of cases and reduction
in damages in 17.5% of cases, while plaintiffs obtain full reversal in 12% of cases; further reporting proplaintiff results at trial in 24% of title II cases and 20% of title III cases in pool of appealed cases contrasted
with study showing 6% of pro-plaintiff trial results in title I cases in similar pool); see also id. at 1853 (“My
research shows very few Title III cases have been decided against plaintiffs at the appellate level because
the requested accommodation was too expensive.”); cf. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (reporting success rate for defendants in
93% of title I cases at trial level and 84% in cases reaching courts of appeals).
273
See Waterstone, supra note 250, at 1845-48 (collecting cases involving public benefits, voting, and
removal of architectural barriers). The analogous accommodations provision of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2010), forbidding disability discrimination by federal government in its activities and
programs has also been read expansively. See, e.g., Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256,
1267-74 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that modifications to paper currency to permit blind persons to
distinguish denominations met test of reasonableness if that test were applied, that absence of tactile or
other features denied meaningful access to currency, and that Treasury Department failed to show undue
burden).
274
District court opinions denying accommodations may be an unrepresentative sample given that a district
court is more likely to write an opinion when granting a defendant’s summary judgment motion, a decision
that is final, than denial of the motion, which is interlocutory. Cf. Ruth Colker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (“[A] decision to grant
summary judgment is more likely to result in a written opinion than a decision to dismiss or enter a verdict .
. . .”).
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impose stringent duties. In McDonald v. Department of Environmental Quality,275 the
Montana Supreme Court took a position quite different from that in cases such as Vande
Zande that a cost-benefit analysis must be applied to accommodations and that requests
will be viewed harshly. McDonald overturned the dismissal of a state law reasonable
accommodation claim asserted by an employee with mental and other impairments who
had already been permitted to use a service dog to help her keep her balance while
walking and to keep her alert while at her desk, but whose dog could not navigate tiled
floor surfaces without slipping and occasionally falling and injuring itself.276 The court
ruled that installing carpet runners or another non-slip floor surface in the building to
permit use of the dog could constitute a reasonable accommodation.277 Other state courts
applying state statutory duties of reasonable accommodation have also found triable
issues of fact on accommodations many federal courts would likely find too unusual or
expensive. For example, a California court required trial over the reasonableness of the
employer’s furnishing a motorized scooter to a production supervisor with a hammertoe
condition so he could more easily move around the factory floor.278
4. Looking to the Jury. A serious challenge to plaintiffs making accommodations
claims is the reluctance of federal district courts to defer to jury decisions and a
reluctance—though perhaps not quite as great—on the part of courts of appeals to force
them to do so. In the mid-1980s, the United States Supreme Court signaled to lower
federal courts that they had more freedom to use summary judgment than previously
275

214 P.3d 749 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 764.
277
Id. Montana law is similar to the ADA with regard to reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19)(b) (West 2010).
278
Ayzenshteyn v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., NO. B196458, 2009 WL 27188 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009)
(unpublished-noncitable). The California Fair Housing and Employment Act’s language on reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship matches that of the ADA. See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940(m) (West
2010).
276
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exercised.279 In ADA cases, courts have taken this authority and run with it. The
frequent use of summary judgment in cases having to do with reasonable accommodation
has led to fewer decisions in which juries, drawing on common experience, have the
opportunity to draw conclusions about reasonability different from those of judges
inclined to sympathize with employers.280 Sometimes the courts’ use of language is
revealing. For example, in Filar v. Board of Education, a substitute teacher with
osteoarthritis who could not drive or walk long distances and thus needed assignment to a
school close to public transportation, asked for a variance from the school board’s roving
substitute assignment system.281 The court of appeals affirmed a grant of summary
judgment against the teacher.282 It commented that “the question is whether her
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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“We think that the position taken by the
majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252-56 (suggesting greater availability of summary judgment in public-figure defamation case);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986) (upholding entry of
summary judgment in factual context of antitrust case).
280
Colker, supra note 274, at 101 (“My review of the litigation outcome data-combined with my
individualized review of every appellate decision and many of the district court cases decided since the
ADA became effective in 1992-leads to the conclusion that district and appellate courts are deploying two
strategies that result in markedly pro-defendant outcomes under the ADA. Courts are abusing the summary
judgment device and failing to defer to agency guidance in interpreting the ADA.”); see also Sharona
Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 326-29 (2008)
(discussing role of judicial attitudes in accounting for low win rates in ADA employment litigation). Jeffrey
A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary
Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV.
LITIG. 505 (2000) (collecting and analyzing “data from jury research in connection with actual litigation,
[that] reveals a general public that is much more enlightened on issues of disability and workplace
accommodation than are many employers--and is thus much less likely to produce pro-defense outcomes
than current dispositive motion practice,” but attributing failure to reach juries to poor advocacy in litigated
cases). These authors attribute the failure to reach juries to poor advocacy. Id. Lawyers often have little
to work with, however. While courts of appeals say they apply a de novo standard in reviewing grants of
summary judgment, see, e.g., Bellino v. Peters, 530 F.3d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2008), too often they defer to
lower courts’ reasonability determinations. See Stein, supra note 70, at 93.
281
526 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2008).
282
Id. at 1068.
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requested accommodation was reasonable, and we don’t think it was.”283 The court
conceded that the claim had “surface appeal,” but said that “aspects of the request
convince us that it was just not reasonable.”284 The court asserted that even if working
around the existing collective bargaining agreement were possible, there would remain
the administrative burden of researching schools in the city that would satisfy the
teacher’s restrictions.285 The court never asked whether a reasonable jury might have
come to a different conclusion after hearing the evidence.286
It will not be easy to wean lower court judges from deciding accommodations
cases on the basis of their own gut reactions. Litigants will need to appeal to the judges’
professionalism and restraint and remind the courts of what Congress intended in 1990
and what courts have required in analogous contexts. A lay jury is in so many respects a
better decider of whether accommodations are reasonable or whether they impose undue
hardship.287 Twelve member of the community will collectively be much more familiar
with the modern workplace than a judge whose non-legal work experience may have
come decades earlier. Many jurors will be far more aware of modern technology and its
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Id. at 1067 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). The court said that one of the convincing aspects was that the accommodation
“would have amounted to preferential treatment, which the ADA does not require.” Id.
285
Filar, 526 F.3d at 1068.
286
A matter of some concern is that the greater license afforded district courts to dismiss cases at the
pleadings stage under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), may exacerbate this condition. See Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372296
(expressing concern that Twombly may lead to more frequent dismissals of ADA cases). Given the
presence of an EEOC charge in an ADA title I case, it seems doubtful that the employer needs the federal
court complaint to be on notice of what the case is about. The dismissals on the pleadings thus seem more
significant for the judge’s underlying message, “In my opinion, this is a weak claim. Go away.” See
Torres v. Am. Auto Parts, No. 07 C 3702, 2008 WL 2622835 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2008) (noting contents of
EEOC charge and right to sue letter filling out information about case, but nevertheless dismissing case
brought pro se concerning alleged failure to accommodate by making plaintiff stand while doing work).
287
Professor Sunstein, it should be noted, is skeptical of the use of juries in accommodations cases. See
Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1905-06. Much of his concern, however, stems from doubts about juries’ ability
to make cost-benefits analyses, something they should not be doing under a proper reading of the statute.
284
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potential than judges will. Moreover, since jurors are not bound by determinations about
what was not required in a previous case, they can approach the case with a more
dynamic view, a view in all respects closer to that envisioned by the framers of the ADA.
C.

PREFERENCES, NEUTRAL POLICIES, AND “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION”
Judicial errors about the ADA’s supposed failure to enact preferences, and

preservation of neutral policies may be challenged by attention to the statute and its
history, its interpretation in Barnett, and the interpretation of comparable provisions in
other jurisdictions. The comparison to “affirmative action” is wrong and should be
abandoned.
1. Looking to the Statute and Its History. As noted above, the statute in its text,
history, and regulatory agency interpretation, requires preferences for workers with
disabilities. These preferences are in the form of accommodations—variances from
otherwise neutral rules. The preferences are part of treating someone differently in order
to treat the person fairly.288 If departure from an otherwise neutral rule is sought, the
statute and its contextual materials are the first line of support.
2. Looking to Barnett.. The second line is Barnett. The Court could not have
made it clearer that the ADA’s accommodations provision requires preferences: “The
Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’ that are needed for
288

The unadorned use of the term “preference” may be criticized on the ground that what is a preference
from one perspective, that of the person without a disability, is simply equal treatment from the perspective
of the person with a disability. See Anita Silvers, Protection or Privilege? Reasonable Accommodation,
Reverse Discrimination, and the Fair Costs of Repairing Recognition for Disabled People in the
Workforce, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 561, 571 (2005) (“The ADA proposes to alter social practice so as
not to exclude individuals with the kinds of biological differences that people have come to label
“disabilities. But, in Barnett and other ADA cases, the Court has stigmatized the recognition that policies
for accommodating their differences afford the disabled by characterizing such accommodations as
preferential.”) (footnote omitted); see also Burgdorf, supra note73, at 298 (“Barnett’s designation of
reasonable accommodation as “special” and “preferential,”. . . is inartful, misguided, and damaging. It
fosters the misconception that the ADA gives people with disabilities some type of advantage over people
without disabilities.”). Nevertheless, the subtlety of that point would likely have been lost on lower courts,
who have had trouble enough even requiring any departures from seemingly neutral rules.
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those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without
disabilities automatically enjoy.”289 That Justice Scalia would dissent on this issue is
unremarkable; obviously, some courts and other authorities took this position before
Barnett came down.290 What is more surprising, however, is that so many courts have
failed to realize that the majority of the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning.
Humiston-Keeling continues to be followed; Aka and similar cases feel more like the
exception as courts continue to assert that the ADA does not require “preferences” for
employees with disabilities or departure from neutral rules.291
3. Looking to Interpretations in Other Jurisdictions. When federal courts ignore
the clear implications of a Supreme Court decision, it may be quixotic to expect them to
follow state court cases. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many state decisions
interpreting statutes similar to the ADA reject the position that neutral employment
practices such as filling all positions with the person most qualified provide a justification
not to afford a reasonable accommodation such as preferential transfer of employees with
disabilities who cannot do their jobs to vacant positions they can perform. In a case
289

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002); see also id. (“By definition any special
‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e.,
preferentially.”). Many commentators have pressed this point. E.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially
Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based
Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 255 (2003) (“By definition a special “accommodation” requires
the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the
difference in treatment violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the
accommodation beyond the Act’s potential reach.”). The Supreme Court foreshadowed its conclusion that
reasonable accommodation entails preferences when it held that a state could act rationally in the
constitutional sense if as an employer it denied accommodations in order to continue to use existing
inaccessible facilities. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
290
The position bears a similarity to that in Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a Causal
Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237, 249 (1989) (proposing reading of section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act to cover only instances in which claimant’s disability medically causes a limit on
specific physical activity). For a response to Professor Lawson see Weber, supra note 237, at 1112 n.130.
291
See, e.g., Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2008) (asserting that ADA does not
require preferences for employees with disabilities). Professor Anderson points out that title VII thinking
may lie at the root of these interpretations. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 15 (“Courts likely place so
much emphasis on the characterization of the employer’s policy as ‘legitimate’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’
because they cannot get beyond thinking about the ADA in traditional Title VII terms.”).

72

under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the court reversed a grant of
summary judgment to a bank that had failed to find offer a job reassignment of a full-time
position to an employee who, after being the victim of a bank robbery, suffered posttraumatic stress disorder and could no longer work with the public or with money.292
Noting that the bank had not “definitively” established that it had no vacant positions the
employee could fill,293 the court rejected the claim that an employee with a disability is
entitled to no more than the right to compete for open slots: “To the extent Wells Fargo
rejected Jensen for positions for which she was qualified because it had applicants who
were more qualified or had seniority, it overlooks that when reassignment of an existing
employee is the issue, the disabled employee is entitled to preferential consideration.”294
4. Banishing the Ghost of “Affirmative Action.” Acknowledging that the ADA
enacts a form of preference by requiring accommodation does not, of course, say
anything at all about affirmative action, and the two terms should not be confused. As
Professor Ball notes, reasonable accommodation requires an individualized assessment of
specific individuals whereas affirmative action is a class-based approach; moreover,
affirmative action is a remedy not a right, whereas failure to provide accommodations is
defined as a form of discrimination itself.295 Thus affirmative action and reasonable
accommodation may both entail preferences, but affirmative action and reasonable
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accommodation are different in both character and operation.296 This all should have
been clear since Alexander v. Choate297 twenty-five years ago, but courts seem strangely
drawn to the erroneous understanding.

CONCLUSION
The core of the ADA is the accommodation obligation, and the next few years
will show whether courts will prove true to the ADA as Congress enacted it. To be true
to the statute, courts need to return to its text, its history, and its authoritative
interpretations. If they do so, they will apply an obligation to accommodate up to a limit
of due hardship, rather than separating out reasonableness from what is undue. They will
impose a substantial, dynamic obligation using a cost-resources balance, and defer
appropriately to jury decisions. And they will not shy away from requiring preferential
treatment when an accommodation does not entail an undue hardship. Doing so is no
more than obeying Congress’s command.
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